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RICHARD A. BOOTH*
The Future of Securities Litigation
INTRODUCTION
THERE WAS NOTHING SURPRISING ABOUT THE RESULT IN Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,' the latest decision of the United States Su-
preme Court dealing with securities fraud under Rule lOb-5.2 The holding in
Stoneridge was little more than a reiteration of the settled point that there is no
private right of action based on aiding and abetting securities fraud as the Court
ruled fourteen years ago in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A. To be sure, Central Bank had left open the possibility that a secon-
dary defendant might somehow participate in a fraud perpetrated by another pri-
mary defendant and thus be liable under Rule 10b-5.4 But the Court clearly stated
that to be held liable, the secondary defendant itself must have violated Rule 10b-
5V In essence, the question in Stoneridge was what constitutes participation in se-
curities fraud. Rule 10b-5 outlaws any "device, scheme, or artifice" to commit fraud
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.6 The Central Bank Court had
not considered the possibility that the word "scheme" may be read to extend liabil-
ity to anyone who contributes to a scheme to defraud. In other words, the plaintiffs
in Stoneridge sought to impose liability for something like civil conspiracy to all
participants in the scheme.' The defendant argued that to be liable under Rule 10b-
Martin G. McGuinn Professor of Business Law, Villanova University School of Law.
1. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
3. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
4. Id. at 191.
5. Id. Specifically, the Court notes that "[a]ny person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank,
who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for
primary liability under Rule l0b-5 are met." Id.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
7. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008). Compare Ins. Co.
of N. Am. v. Miller, 765 A.2d 587, 598 (Md. 2001) (holding that where the appellee stipulated the existence of a
principal-agent relationship, the appellee breached his fiduciary duty to the appellant by participating in and
profiting from a double financing scheme), and Ford v. BaIt. City Sheriffs Office, 814 A.2d 127, 134 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2002) (stating that a party may bring a tort action against the state under a claim of vicarious
liability when that tort is "committed by a State employee acting within the scope of his or her employment
and without malice or gross negligence"), with Lloyd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 A.2d 257, 284 (Md. 2007)
(stating that a civil conspiracy claim requires "1) [a] confederation of two or more persons by agreement or
understanding; 2) some unlawful or tortious act done in furtherance of the conspiracy or use of unlawful or
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5, a plaintiff must satisfy all the elements of the rule personally To be specific, a
plaintiff must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant,
(2) scienter, (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the
purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission,
(5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.9 In particular, the defendant argued that
it had made no deceptive statement as required under the rule.' °
I. THE FACTUAL SETTING
In Central Bank, the defendant (Central Bank) served as indenture trustee for
bonds issued by the Colorado Public Building Authority (PBA) in 1986 to finance a
real estate development by the developer AmWest." The bonds were secured by
land, and the indenture required that the value of the land be at least 160% of the
outstanding principal and interest on the bonds. 2 AmWest was required under the
indenture to submit annual reports to the indenture trustee. In 1988, AmWest sub-
mitted a report showing no change in value. 3 The underwriter of the bond issue
expressed doubts about the report because land values had been falling in the
area. 4 Central Bank concluded that the report was too optimistic and that a new
independent appraisal of the property was necessary.' But, at the behest of
AmWest and the PBA, Central Bank agreed to delay a new appraisal until after a
new issue of bonds under the indenture. 6 In the end, the issuer defaulted, 7 and the
bond investors sued under Rule 10b-5, claiming that Central Bank had aided and
abetted the fraud.' The Court ultimately disagreed, holding that nothing in the
tortious means to accomplish an act not in itself illegal; and 3) [alctual legal damage resulting to the plaintiff")
(internal quotations omitted). In Ford, the court found that a vicarious liability claim could not be made
because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the state owed a duty to him. 814 A.2d at 140-41. In Lloyd, the
respondents took part in a conspiracy because they agreed to coordinate their activities so as to stifle competi-
tion within the automotive market. 916 A.2d at 285. Although the Stoneridge Court does not discuss it, it seems
likely that most instances of fraud under Rule lob-5 involve actors who satisfy only one or two of the required
elements. See, e.g., Anderson v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 521 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir.
2008). In a corporation, it is unlikely that any one person satisfies all of the elements of liability under Rule
10b-5. Contra SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612-CIV, 2008 WL 4372896, at *16-23 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2008) (hold-
ing a corporation's control person personally liable after finding that his violative conduct satisfied all of the
Rule 10b-5 elements).
8. See Brief in Opposition of Respondent Motorola, Inc. at 8-10, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43)
(arguing the lack of a Rule 10b-5 violation where petitioner fails to show that Motorola made false statements
and that Motorola owed a duty to shareholders).
9. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
10. Brief in Opposition, supra note 8, at 8-9.
11. Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 167 (1994).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 167-68.
16. Id. at 168.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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statute supported aiding and abetting liability and that a secondary actor must be
an actual participant in the fraud in order to be held liable. 9
In Stoneridge, the primary violator was Charter Communications, a struggling
cable television provider.2" In order to beef up reported advertising revenue, Char-
ter bought converter boxes at inflated prices from Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola,
who in turn agreed to spend the excess on advertising to be broadcast over the
Charter cable system.2' Investors who bought Charter stock during the fraud period
filed a class action.22 But Charter was deeply in debt and nearly broke,23 so in the
hope of collecting from someone, the plaintiffs also sued Scientific-Atlanta and
Motorola on the theory that they had participated in the scheme because they knew
(or were at least reckless in not knowing) that the purpose of the scheme was to
permit Charter to report inflated advertising revenues.24
II. HOLDING AND REASONING
Few likely expected the Court to hold for the plaintiff in Stoneridge. What is sur-
prising about Stoneridge-at least at first blush-is the Court's reasoning. Follow-
ing Central Bank, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
19. Id. at 191. Another rationale for the holding would have been that as a bond trustee, Central Bank had
virtually no liability to bondholders. It is standard practice in bond indentures to include a waiver of any and
all liability to bondholders. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp (2006). Thus, the plaintiffs' assertion of aiding and abetting
liability was an attempt to circumvent well-settled practice in the bond market. See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at
190-91. It is highly unlikely that the Court would permit federal securities law to upset this convention. Id. at
169-70 (citing Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680-81 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Cleary
v. Perfectune Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th
Cir. 1974)). The result would have been total chaos, so it is quite unlikely that anyone expected any other result
in Central Bank itself. The case is a classic example of the Supreme Court's common practice of making new
law in cases in which it matters little to the outcome. See infra note 69 and accompanying text, discussing Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.
20. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008). In the interest of
full disclosure-and local color-I note that Charter is my internet service and cable television provider and
that my set top boxes are manufactured by Motorola.
21. Id. at 766-67. The Court also noted that, as a result of the sham arrangements with Scientific-Atlanta
and Motorola, Charter was able to inflate its revenue and operating cash flow by $17 million, a number re-
flected in its subsequent financial statements and SEC filings. Id. at 767.
22. Id.
23. See Chief of Charter Communications Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at C3. Charter's annual report
for fiscal year 2005 documented long-term debt in excess of $19 billion. Charter Communications, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at F-4 (Feb. 23, 2005). The attorneys for Stoneridge Investments also noted Charter's debt
and unfavorable financial position in seeking settlement at trial. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing at 7, In re
Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 4045741 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2005) (No. MDL 1506; 4:02-CV-
1186 CAS) ("Charter is a significantly debt ridden company, has very little in the way of current earnings, has
some cash flow, but nonetheless at the end of the day we would have been hard pressed to actually collect from
this company rather than throwing it into bankruptcy."); see also In re Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., No.
MDL 1506; 4:02-CV-1186 CAS, 2004 WL 3826761, at *3-4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2004) (noting that the sham
transactions were entered into even though they would have had "no legitimate effect on Charter's operating
cash flow").
24. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766-67.
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(PSLRA) of 1995.25 Among other things, PSLRA explicitly provided for aiding and
abetting liability but only in an action by the Securities & Exchange Commission
(SEC).26 That should have been enough for the Stoneridge Court. For all the talk
about the power of Congress to change the law if it disagrees with the Court, one
can hardly imagine a better example of Congress saying what it means.27 But the
Court chose to focus its attention elsewhere-on the reliance requirement.28 This is
not to say that the Court failed to note the implications of PSLRA.29 It is only to say
that the Court relegated PSLRA to one of several factors bearing on statutory
interpretation.3 °
Rather than hang his hat on the convenient hook of congressional intent, Justice
Kennedy (who also authored the Central Bank opinion) reasoned that the plaintiffs
in Stoneridge failed to show reliance by Charter investors on any statement by the
secondary defendants.3' The defendants had argued that because they did not speak
to the market, they could not be held to have misled the market. 2 Fraud requires
deception.33 Here the secondary defendants agreed to the scheme cooked up by
Charter. 4 But they certainly did not deceive Charter in doing so, since Charter
allegedly requested their participation.3" Justice Kennedy was quick to point out
that conduct can be deceiving. 6 One need not speak to deceive.37
This seems clearly to be correct. How else could insider trading be illegal? It is a
fraud that depends on stealth.38 To be sure, insider trading also requires that the
defendant have some sort of duty to the source of the information not to use the
information for personal gain or at least not to do so without disclosing the
intent to do so to the source of the information.39 In a phrase: disclose or abstain.4"
25. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006).
27. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 19 (1995).
28. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
29. Id. at 769, 771, 773.
30. Id. at 772-73.
31. Id. at 769.
32. Opposition Brief of Defendant-Appellee Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. at 8, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 443 F.3d 987 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1974).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
34. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 768-69.
37. Id. at 769.
38. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 661. There is a subtle ambiguity in the mantra of disclose or abstain. When the SEC incants these
words, it usually means that the market (and especially other stockholders) must be informed first before one
can trade on inside information. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228-29 (1980). But the
phrase has been appropriated (or misappropriated) to suggest that an agent must inform his principal before
using confidential information for personal gain. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. To be sure, it is often said that
the stockholders own the corporation. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or
How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAw. 429, 430 (1998). Thus, insiders may be seen
as their agents. See Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 4 n.12
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But it is the duty that comes first. Disclosure is just one way to satisfy the
duty.4'
Given the need to preserve conduct as fraud, it seems quite natural that Justice
Kennedy would focus instead on reliance.42 As he notes, the Stoneridge plaintiffs did
not rely on any statement by the secondary defendants. 3 More important, there
was no automatic presumption of reliance." The secondary defendants had no duty
to speak that would trigger a presumption of reliance on an omission.4" They made
no statement to the market that would trigger the presumption on the integrity of
the market under the fraud-on-the-market theory.46
Having found no reliance or presumption thereof, the Court addresses the argu-
ment that the secondary defendants participated in the scheme cooked up by Char-
ter upon which the plaintiffs clearly did rely. 7 The Court explains that this
argument does not answer the objection that the plaintiffs did not rely on the
deceptive conduct of the secondary defendants. 8 Sensing perhaps that this begs the
question, the Court holds that the actions of the secondary defendants were too
remote to be the subject of a private cause of action.49 In other words, those actions
cannot be said to have been a proximate cause of the injury to plaintiffs."0 But the
Court offers little guidance about what would constitute proximate cause other
than to say that, "[i]t was Charter, not respondents, that misled its auditor and filed
fraudulent financial statements; nothing respondents did made it necessary or in-
evitable for Charter to record the transactions as it did."5' In this sense, Stoneridge
preserves some hope for plaintiffs and their lawyers that some secondary defend-
ants may still be within the reach of a private action under Rule 10b-5. 2 As the
(2008). But in a classic principal and agent relationship, the principal can always forbid the agent to use
confidential information. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY §§ 395-96 (1958). In other words, the agent is
not necessarily free to pursue a personal profit simply because he informs the principal of his intent to do so.
See id. at § 395. Therefore "disclose or abstain" seems to have taken on a life of its own.
41. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654. The emphatic statement that conduct can be deceiving may be as important
as anything else that the Court said in Stoneridge. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769. In one recent SEC enforce-
ment action, the defendant hacked into a computer network, obtained nonpublic information about a stock,
and then sold the stock shortly before it fell dramatically in price. SEC v. Dorozhko, No. 07 Civ. 9606 (NRB),
2008 WL 126612, at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2008). The district court ruled that the hacker's trading did not
constitute insider trading because there could be no deceit without a fiduciary or similar duty not to use the
information for personal gain. Id. at *20. Never mind that everyone has a duty not to steal.
42. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. Fraud-on-the-market is based on the idea that in a fully developed securities market, a company's
stock price reflects all available information about a company. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42
(1988) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
47. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770-72.
48. Id. at 770.
49. Id. at 769.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 770.
52. Id. at 773-74.
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Court states: "secondary actors ...are not necessarily immune [to] private suit.
The securities statutes provide an express private right of action against account-
ants and underwriters in certain circumstances ... and the implied right of action
in § 10(b) continues to cover secondary actors who commit primary violations.5
So it is far from clear that Stoneridge changes much of anything except to foreclose
the possibility that the word "scheme" has some special significance. 4
III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
Some scholars argue that the effect of Stoneridge is to limit the scope of the private
right of action under Rule 10b-5 without limiting the scope of the rule as it might
be used by the SEC or Department of Justice (DOJ).55 The government need not
prove reliance in the same way that a private litigant must,56 because the govern-
ment does not need to prove damages.5 7 Thus, it is arguable that Stoneridge is about
who may sue and be sued in a private civil action. 8 It is about something like
standing (though obviously that concept does not fit well for defendants). 9 In
short, Stoneridge is just another example of the ongoing effort of the Supreme
Court to confine the scope of Rule 10b-5 at least insofar as it may be used by
private litigants.6 ° The problem is that there have been notable decisions that also
limit the reach of the government.6' So why did the Court not focus more on
PSLRA than on the common law elements of fraud? Congress itself had already
fashioned a distinction between public and private actions under Rule 10b-5.62
Moreover, the SEC and the DOJ cannot completely ignore the reliance element of a
fraud claim under Rule 10b-5.63 The government must prove materiality.64 And
materiality implies reliance in omission cases.65 So if the goal is to limit private
actions without affecting public actions, Stoneridge does not accomplish much.
53. Id. (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 770.
55. See A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The Political Economy of Secur-
ities Class Action Reform, CATO SUP. CT. REV., Sept. 2008, at 232-33. Indeed, Justice Kennedy seems to confirm
this interpretation. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
56. Pritchard, supra note 55, at 232 n.50 (citing United States v. Haddy, 134 F.3d 542, 549-51 (3d Cir.
1998)).
57. See Gutstein v. United States, No. 95-56216, 86 F.3d 1162, 1996 WL 266493, at *2 (9th Cir. May 17,
1996).
58. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770-74.
59. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
60. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 753-55 (1975); id. at 770 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
61. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1983).
62. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768-69.
63. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2008).
65. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768; Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 341-42; Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972).
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There is another possible interpretation of Stoneridge that is much more far
reaching. It seems clear that Stoneridge is really about causation-in this case trans-
action causation.66 It is not likely a coincidence that another recent Supreme Court
decision, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, was also about causation-in that
case damages causation.67 Moreover, as noted above, Stoneridge is a case that could
easily have been decided on other grounds.6" And Dura Pharmaceuticals is a case
that the Court did not really need to take.69 Thus, it appears that the Court is
particularly interested in causation.7"
It is unfortunate that the Court chose to focus on causation and the notoriously
vague notion of proximate cause. As a result, the Court was more or less forced
into a lame discussion of policy considerations, such as the possibility that the
extension of liability to such schemes might drive foreign business away from US
capital markets.7' It would have been much better if the Court had focused instead
on making sense out of U.S. securities regulation.
For those of us who oppose securities fraud class actions ("SFCAs"), this suggests
an opportunity-if not an invitation from the Court-to argue for a fundamental
change.72 To be specific, the Court may well be receptive to the argument that, in
cases such as Stoneridge, there is no fraud because there is no damage. Let me
explain.
66. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776.
67. 544 U.S. at 346.
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. Dura Pharmaceuticals concerned whether an investor pleading securities fraud could satisfy the loss
causation requirement by alleging that the stock's price on the date of purchase was inflated due to misrepre-
sentation. 544 U.S. at 338. The Court held that in order to state a cause of action, there must be a causal
connection between the information withheld and stock price. Id. at 346. In other words, the information must
be material in the sense that it matters to the market enough to affect stock price. See id. at 344-45. The
problem is that the plaintiffs can always argue that the information became known to some in the market
before the official disclosure. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We
Know It, 4 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 1, 24 n.57 (2007) [hereinafter Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action]. Indeed, it
may well strengthen the case so to argue because it suggests insider trading during the fraud period. So Dura
Pharmaceuticals was one of those cases in which the Court can make new law without affecting the outcome of
the case much. See Matthew Fry, Pleading and Proving Loss Causation in Fraud-On-The-Market-Based Securities
Suits Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 31, 49 (2008). As Fry explains:
One reason the Court left so many ways to differentiate its opinion in Dura may have been because
the facts presented in the case lent themselves to only one decision. The Supreme Court may have
known that it was ignoring some of [the] broader policy concerns by focusing in on the narrow
situation presented by the case.
Id. Although the issue was not raised in Stoneridge, a review of the trading in Charter stock during the fraud
period raises the same questions.
70. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770; see also Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 345-46.
71. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772 (noting that the extension of liability could have the effect of deterring
overseas firms from doing business in the U.S., causing an increase in the cost of becoming a publicly traded
company in the U.S. and shifting securities offerings to markets abroad).
72. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006) (arguing for greater judicial scrutiny in the settlement alloca-
tion of securities class actions to ensure that settlement costs are borne by the culpable parties, not the innocent
shareholders) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action].
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IV. BAD SECURITIES LITIGATION
Stoneridge is a classic stock-drop class action." The plaintiffs bought outstanding
Charter stock in the open market at a time when the price was allegedly too high
because the market had been given false information about Charter's finances.74 It
is not a case alleging that Charter itself had fraudulently sold stock to the public at
an inflated price.7" In other words, it is not a case in which Charter obtained money
by a fraudulent public offering and should be made to give it back.76 In a stock-
drop case-as in musical chairs-someone is going to suffer the loss one way or
the other.77 The so-called fraud is nothing more than a delay of the inevitable.7"
The loss suffered by those who buy during the fraud period-the period before the
truth comes out-is nothing more than bad luck in buying at the wrong time.79
73. The underlying securities fraud action in Stoneridge alleged that the respondents engaged in a scheme
to produce misleading financial statements, which, in turn, affected stock price. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. According to the amicus brief filed by the United States
Solicitor General, the class period was November 8, 1999 (the date of the Charter IPO) through July 17, 2002.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 5, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43).
But the complaint contained no claim based on the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act). See generally Stoner-
idge, 128 S. Ct. at 766 (showing the Court only considered a private right of action under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act)). The scheme that formed the basis of the complaint was
cooked up in August 2000 because Charter feared that its revenues would not meet market expectations. See id.
Those results would have been reported on or about April 1, 2001. See Class Action Complaint at 12, In re
Charter Commc'ns, Inc., Sec. Litig., 2005 WL 4045741 (E.D. Mo. June 30, 2005) (No. MDL 1506; 4:02-CV-
1186 CAS). Charter (CHTR) went public at $19 per share (for 170,000,000 shares) and closed at an all-time
high of $26.31 on December 3, 1999. Answers.com, Charter Communications, http://www.answers.com/topic/
charter-communications (last visited Sept. 28, 2008); DeepMarket Stock Blog, Historical Analysis of Charter
Communications Inc - CHTR, available at http://www.deepmarket.com/history/chtr (last visited Oct. 5, 2008).
The most dramatic drop in price came during September 2001 when the stock dropped from $20.47 on Sep-
tember 4 to $12 on September 27. Yahoo! Finance, Charter Communications, Inc., http://finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=CHTR (input dates: 09/04/2001 & 09/27/2001; then follow "Get Prices" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 1,
2008). The stock rebounded thereafter and ended the year around $17 per share. Id. (input dates: 12/27/2001 &
12/31/2001). The price dropped steadily during the year 2002 except for a bump up attributable to rumors of a
buyout by the founder Paul Allen. Mike Farrell, Charter Surges on Allen Buyout Hopes, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
Aug. 5, 2002, http://www.multichannel.com/article/CA237213.html. The stock ended the year at $1.18. Yahoo!
Finance, supra (input date: 12/31/2002). There was no noticeable price change around the time that Charter
issued a comprehensive restatement of its financial reports on April 1, 2003. Yahoo! Finance, supra (input dates:
03/31/2003 & 04/01/2003). Indeed, the stock closed at $1.03 that day, up $0.20 from the day before. See id. It is
thus difficult to see the rationale for the alleged class period other than the possibility that Stoneridge (the lead
plaintiff) did not buy any Charter stock after July 17, 2002 when the stock closed at $4.06. Yahoo! Finance,
supra (input dates: 07/17/2002). The SEC's administrative action against Charter can be found at Charter
Commc'ns, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-50098, 83 S.E.C. Docket 1254 (July 25, 2008), available at http://
sec.gov/litigation/admin/34- 50098.htm.
76. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
77. See Ian B. Lee, Fairness and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUNI. Bus. L. REV. 119, 160-61 (discussing the
losses suffered by outside traders who will unknowingly purchase during the fraud period regardless of
whether or not insiders are also trading).
78. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 24 n.57.
79. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless and Without
Wheels": Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 627, 634 (2007) (noting that bad luck stemming from corporate fraud will inevitably affect
even active and diversified investors); Lee, supra note 77, at 160-61 (discussing how outside investors are
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The bad luck of buyers is offset-dollar for dollar-by the good luck of investors
who happen to sell at the right time."° In other words, securities fraud in the con-
text of a stock drop action is a zero-sum game.8 '
A stock-drop action under Rule 10b-5 usually arises from the failure of a publicly
traded company to disclose material information in a timely fashion. 2 The dis-
closed information may be either good or bad news. 3 In other words, an action
may be triggered by news that causes the price of a stock to rise (in which case
those who sold during the fraud period suffer harm) or by news that causes the
price of a stock to fall (in which case those who bought during the fraud period
unlucky in the sense that they do not know that the shares they purchase or sell have either inflated or deflated
prices).
80. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 10 (discussing how investor gains and losses
offset each other, as for every investor who suffers a loss due to purchasing a share, there is an investor that
gains due to the sale of a share).
81. Id. It is important to be clear that the focus here is on SFCAs arising under Rule lOb-5 and relating to
trading in outstanding shares. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761,
767 (2008) (noting that the class action alleged violations of § 10(b) and Rule IOb-5). The argument does not
apply to actions arising under the 1933 Act and relating to the public offer of shares by issuers and their agents.
Richard A. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously-Why There Is No Such Thing as an Adequate Representative in
a Securities Fraud Class Action I (Villanova Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 108, 2008),
available at http:l/ssrn.comlabstract=1026768 [hereinafter Booth, Taking Certification Seriously]. A stock-drop
action is fundamentally different from an action based on a fraudulent offering by an issuer company. Richard
A. Booth, What Is A Business Crime?, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 127, 142-43 (2008) [hereinafter, Booth, Business
Crime] (noting that in the case of a misstatement or omission made in the context of an offering, an investor
has a direct cause of action against the issuer for taking the misled investor's money). In a fraudulent offering,
the company obtains funds under false pretenses and investors may recover under the 1933 Act. 48 Stat. 74,
82-84, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (2006). In a stock-drop action, buyers of outstanding stock seek to recover losses
when the stock declines in price as a result of the disclosure of bad news that allegedly should have been
disclosed before the buyers bought. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 6. A stock-drop
action is typically based on the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act and specifically Rule lob-5 thereunder. See
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). These two types of actions may arise simultaneously if a publicly traded com-
pany issues additional stock. In such a case, those who buy the newly issued stock sue under the 1933 Act. See
Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1160 (10th Cir. 2000). And those who buy outstanding stock sue under Rule
lob-5. See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 1176, 1179-80 (N.D. Cal. 1993). It is much easier to make
out a case under the 1933 Act, but damages are limited to the difference between the offer price and the market
price after decline. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). Under the 1934 Act, damages are the difference between purchase price
and market price after decline. Levine v. Seion, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1971). Thus, an individual who
buys newly issued stock in the aftermarket at a price higher than the issue price would really have two claims,
one under each act. See, e.g., Blatt v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 916 F. Supp. 1343, 1347
(D.N.J. 1996) (plaintiffs brought claims under the 1933 and the 1934 Acts). For the year 2006, only about 12%
of cases involved fraudulent offerings. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS FILINGS,
2006: A YEAR IN REVIEW 20 (2007), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse-research/
2006_YIR/20070102-0l.pdf [hereinafter CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 2006]. The focus here is on stock-drop ac-
tions under the 1934 Act. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766-67.
82. See In re Silicon Graphics Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 979-83 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Glenfed, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1543-45 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Terrence G. Stolly, Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Unexpected Implications on Director and Office Liability and D&O Insurance, 29
CAP. U. L. REv. 545, 552-53 n.48 (2001); Kevin E. Warner, Rethinking Trades "On the Basis of'Inside Informa-
tion: Some Interpretations of SEC Rule lOb5-I, 83 B.U. L. REV. 281, 288 (2003).
83. See Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Beware of Vaporware: Product Hype and the Securities
Fraud Liability of High Tech Companies, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 61-62 (1994); Booth, Securities Fraud Class
Action, supra note 69, at 5-6.
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suffer harm).,4 There are notable examples of both types of fraud."5 But actions
based on bad news are far more common. 6 Thus, the discussion here is based on
the premise that securities fraud involves the failure to disclose bad news in a timely
way.
In a bad news case, the plaintiff class consists of all who purchased the stock in
question during the fraud period and continue to hold it until corrective disclo-
sure.87 The standard approach to damages in a bad news case is to award the differ-
ence between the price paid by the buyer and the market price after corrective
disclosure. 8 And it is the company (or its insurance company) that pays the
award. 9
Although some investors may recover substantial sums in a class action, most
investors lose from such actions.9" Most investors are diversified.9 And a diversified
84. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 5-6.
85. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (discussing fraudulent good news); In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994) (discussing fraudulent bad
news). There are many other forms of securities fraud, such as those based on face-to-face dealings and those
resulting from corporate level mismanagement, but these are rarely amenable to class actions. See generally M.
Owen Donley, III, A (Very Brief) Encyclopedia of Securities Fraud, Bus. L. TODAY, Apr. 16, 2007, at 35 (defining
various types of securities fraud). SFCAs customarily result from an issuer's failure to disclose material infor-
mation to the market in a timely manner. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 83, at 51.
86. Actions based on fraudulent bad news are more common because of the way damages are awarded in
SFCAs. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 6. Because the company pays, the stock price
falls further-thus enhancing damages through positive feedback and making the SFCA that much more lucra-
tive for a plaintiff's lawyers. See id. at 5. In a good news action, the SFCA has the effect of muting the price
increase through negative feedback and ultimately reduces the potential award. Id. at 21. Data indicate that of
the 104 SFCAs filed in 2006, only two involved good news. Richard A. Booth, Direct and Derivative Claims in
Securities Fraud Class Actions (forthcoming).
87. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 6 n.7; Booth, Taking Certification Seriously,
supra note 81, at 2 n.6.
88. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 6 n.8; Booth, Taking Certification Seriously,
supra note 81, at 2 n.7.
89. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1550.
90. See Richard A. Booth, The End of Securities Fraud Class Action?, 29 REGULATION 46, 46, 48 (2006)
[hereinafter Booth, The End of Securities]; see also Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at
1545-47.
91. A conservative estimate is that more than three-quarters of all stock in the United States is held by well
diversified investors. See Richard A. Booth, The Missing Link Between Insider Trading and Securities Fraud, 2 J.
Bus. & TECH. L. 185, 189-90 (2007) [hereinafter Booth, Missing Link]. Indeed, it is fair to say that it is irra-
tional for most investors not to diversify. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 22. By investing
in a well diversified portfolio of stocks, an investor can eliminate company-specific risk without any sacrifice of
return. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 7. For every company that underperforms, an-
other will overperform. See id. Only the average matters. If it is possible to eliminate risk without any sacrifice
of return, a rational investor will do so. Id. Accordingly, a rational investor diversifies. Id. Although it may go
without saying, the focus here is on passive investors. The logic of diversification does not necessarily apply to
an investor who seeks to exert control over a company or to pursue other idiosyncratic strategies. See id. at 15
n.40. For examples, see Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 21, 38-46 (2006). On the other hand, there is nothing to keep such an investor from
seeking to diversify if possible. Indeed, some private equity firms have grown large enough to diversify. See
Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor
Oversight, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 225, 291-92 (2007) (observing that "even a relatively small $100 million private
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investor is equally likely to sell or buy an overpriced stock.92 For such investors,
gains and losses wash out over time.93 In other words, a diversified investor is likely
to gain from the timely sale of an overpriced stock about as often as she loses from
the untimely purchase of an overpriced stock.94 But the investor who innocently
sells an overpriced stock need not disgorge her (effective) gain, and over time, such
gains make up for losses.95 In other words, a diversified investor is effectively in-
sured against securities fraud by virtue of being diversified.96 Thus, diversified in-
vestors are net losers to the extent of attorney fees and other costs of litigation,
including such intangibles as management distraction.97 These costs without bene-
equity fund is more than large enough to pursue a strategy of low-cost, passive diversification") (footnote
omitted). By shedding some of the risk that they would otherwise be forced to bear, these firms may grow even
larger in the future. To be sure, some passive investors remain undiversified. See Booth, Missing Link, supra, at
189 n.36. But it seems clear that as a matter of policy, the law should consider the interests of the vast majority
of investors and may safely ignore the interests of irrational investors. Id. Studies indicate that an investor can
achieve adequate diversification with as few as twenty different stocks. Illig, supra, at 291. For a particularly
readable explanation of the virtues of diversification, see BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL
STREET 227-50 (W.W. Norton & Company 1996) (1973). Moreover, it is essentially costless to diversify. Booth,
Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 12. Most individual investors diversify by investing in mutual
funds and similar pooled investment vehicles. Id. To be sure, funds charge a variety of fees in addition to the
direct expenses of holding and trading portfolio securities. Id. at 12 n.28. But there are comparable fees and
expenses involved in maintaining an individual account. Id. at 12 n.29. Thus, even a very small investor may
invest in a fully diversified portfolio of several hundred different stocks. Id. at 12 (stating that "[ajlthough it
might at first seem as if only the very wealthy can afford to hold as many as 200 or 300 stocks, complete
diversification is available very cheaply through mutual funds for investors with as little as $1,000 to invest").
Many investors also diversify across asset classes. See Andy Kirkpatrick, A Global Approach .To Diversification In
Ohio, 17 OHIo PROB. L.J 178 (2007) ("Diversification can be thought of as an investment strategy that 'slices' a
portfolio across different asset and sub-asset classes."). But the discussion here is focused solely on stock inves-
tors, because executive compensation is ultimately an issue of fiduciary duty and fiduciary duty normally runs
only to stockholders. Moreover, diversification carries somewhat different implications for other asset classes.
For example, although it makes perfect sense to diversify a portfolio of bonds in order to reduce the risk of
default, bonds do not offer any significant company-specific upside potential, whereas with stocks, those that
perform above expectation make up for those that perform below expectation.
92. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 3.
93. See Anjan V. Thakor, The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Litigation 6 (U.S. Chamber Insti-
tute for Legal Reform Oct. 2005). The Thakor study included 2,596 large institutional investors who traded in
476 securities that were the subject of class action settlements between December 22, 1995 and August 25, 2005
and found (based on modest assumptions about the timing of trades during fund reporting periods) that the
institutions suffered losses of $43.8 billion and gains of $30.7 billion in the affected securities for a net loss of
$13.1 billion before settlement. Id. at 8 Exhibit A. Interestingly, the institutions' share of settlement proceeds in
these cases was $11.9 billion (less $1.7 billion in attorney fees) for a net loss before attorney fees of just $1.2
billion. Id. The study also found evidence that the pre-settlement losses were attributable to new issues of
securities during the fraud period. Id. at 15. Specifically, $1.5 billion in loss was attributable to IPOs and $10.6
billion in loss was attributable to the half of the non IPO cases involving issuers who were relative net sellers of
stock. Id. at 8 Exhibit A. Just $1 billion in loss was attributable to the half of cases involving companies
classified as non-issuers. Id. (It is unclear why the study divided the remaining cases in half rather than accord-
ing to whether the issuer was in fact a net seller or net buyer during the class period.).
94. See id. at 6.
95. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 3.
96. Id. at 12-13.
97. See id. at 13-14.
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fits are a deadweight loss that reduce investor returns.9" For a diversified investor, it
is the equivalent of paying for two insurance policies against the same risk.99 This
would be quite apparent-and quite controversial-if the law required sellers to
give up their gains to reimburse buyers.
Diversified investors should oppose SFCAs for this reason alone. But diversified
investors lose even more from SFCAs in cases in which they neither buy nor sell the
subject stock-in cases in which they are mere holders of the subject stock."°' To be
specific, the prospect of payout by the defendant company causes its stock price to
fall even more than it would because of the disclosure of new negative informa-
tion.' Stock price goes down by some amount that reflects the bad news and by
some additional amount that reflects the likely settlement with buyer-plaintiffs.' 2
That, in turn, increases the potential damages payable by the subject company,
causing a further decrease in price."3 And so on.0 4 In other words, it triggers a
98. Plaintiff attorney fees average at least 20% of the recovery amount. See Gerald Gornish, Contesting
Attorneys' Fees In Class Actions, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ADVOc., 2d Quarter 2006, at 8-9, available at http://
www.blbglaw.com/news/publications/advocate/2006/02/-res/id=SA-FieI/adv2006Q2.pdf; COMMITTEE ON
CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 72
(2006), available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee InterimReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter
PAULSON REPORT] (finding that plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are typically 25-35% of the recovery). Defense attor-
neys earn about the same. See generally Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Predicting Corporate Governance Risk:
Evidence from the Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance Market, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 495 n.29 (2007)
(stating that "[a ] t one industry conference we attended, lawyers and claims managers disputed the total extent
of the defense costs, but agreed that defense costs were at least 25% of a typical class action settlement").
99. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
100. Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 192.
101. Id.
102. One of the intractable technical problems with SFCAs is that there is no reliable way to determine the
number of damaged shares short of soliciting claim forms from the plaintiff class because many of the damaged
shares may have been traded repeatedly during the class period. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note
69, at 7. This has given rise to several different (and statistically dubious) models that purport to estimate the
number of damaged shares. For a description of the latest model, see Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert Standards
in Calculating Damages for Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 Bus. LAW. 955, 962 (2007) (stating that the
Theoretically-grounded Microstructure Trading Model ("TMTM") uses academic literature and public data to
estimate "the categorization of aggregate trading volume into buys and sells, and ... the average daily trading
propensity"). Although there is no easy way to determine the number of damaged shares, the market may
effectively estimate the number quite efficiently. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS
(2004).
103. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8.
104. Legal scholars noted long ago that the market seems to overreact to bad news and generally blamed it
on market inefficiency. See Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J.
FIN. 793, 795 (1985) (empirically evaluating the overreaction hypothesis and finding market inefficiencies);
Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and lOb-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic, and Policy Analy-
sis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 12 (1994) ("One is hard put to identify specific adverse events.., that could account for
the panic selling that wiped out one quarter of the total value of American stocks. Economists' inability to
explain the 1987 crash by specific changes in fundamentals posed a daunting challenge, particularly to those
who believe capital markets are efficient and investors rational.") (footnote omitted). But a perfectly efficient
market will overreact to bad news-as a result of feedback-if it appears likely that the company will become
the target of securities fraud litigation as a result. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8. This
is not the usual pie-in-the-sky argument that the market knows all. Rather the point is that even if the market is
perfectly efficient it will overreact to bad news that is likely to give rise to a securities fraud class action in the
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positive feedback mechanism that has the effect of magnifying the potential pay-
out. 5 The effect on a target company can be devastating." 6
sense that the market price of the subject stock will fall by more than it should in light of the bad news. Id. In
the real world, the market may fall even further as a result of true (inefficient) overreaction. See id. Needless to
say, the calculus is somewhat different if the plaintiff class can recover from third parties as attempted in
Stoneridge. To be sure, in many cases the settlement is paid by insurance. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98,
at 78 n.1 (noting that a 1995 study indicates that insurance pays about 68% of claims and that defendant
companies pay about 31%). Moreover, there is reason to think that issuers collude with plaintiff lawyers to
settle for amounts that will be covered by insurance. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study
of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 550-52 (1990). One might argue that feedback is
unlikely to be significant because most of the cash for the settlement does not come from the defendant
company. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8 n.14. But the fact that the settlement is
paid by insurance does not eliminate feedback. See id. First, depletion of insurance by the settlement means
that the company is exposed to the possibility of other claims that will not be covered by insurance. See
Howard M. Garfield, Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance: Current Issues in Settlement of Claims, 498
PRACTISING L. INST. COM. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 463, 494-98 (1989). In other words, one
may think of insurance as an off balance sheet asset that supports stock price. Second, insurance is likely to
become more expensive for the settling company in the future (as well as for other companies). See Booth,
Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8 n.14. Thus, the company will have higher insurance expenses
in the future, returns will be lower in the future, and stock price will adjust downward accordingly. See gener-
ally id. So feedback sneaks back into the picture one way or the other. On the other hand, feedback will arise
only to the extent that the market thinks the company will pay. Id. at 3. If it is true that issuers and plaintiff
lawyers generally agree to settle for an amount that will be covered by insurance, presumably the market will
react accordingly. See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1421, 1427 (1994) (arguing that stock price drops following the disclosure of bad news result from three
factors: "(1) the market value of the new information itself; (2) the anticipated costs of litigation over the disclo-
sure; and (3) the value of the termination of subsequent purchasers' right to sue over the information.") (em-
phasis added). In other words, market price will not necessarily fall by an amount that reflects the full amount
of damages that might be awarded, if the market thinks that the case will be settled for some lesser amount. Cf.
id. at 8.
105. The extent of feedback ultimately depends on the number of shares represented by the plaintiff class.
See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8. For example, if the holdings of the plaintiff class
are equal to 50% of the outstanding shares, the decrease in the price of the subject stock will be twice what it
would have been in the absence of a class action. See generally id. The following formula expresses the
relationship:
total decrease in market value = expected decrease / (1 - % of shares damaged)
For example, if the expected decrease in firm value based solely on the revelation of bad news (without feed-
back) is 10% and the plaintiff class-those who bought during the fraud period-represent 40% of the shares,
the total decrease in the value of the shares will be about 17%:
total decrease in market value = .10 / (I - .40) = .10 / .60 = .166
If the plaintiff class represents 50% of the shares, the total decrease in value will be 20%-twice the decrease
that would be seen if there were no threat of a SFCA. And if the plaintiff class represents 80% of the shares, the
total decrease in value will be 50%-five times what it would have been if there were no threat of a SFCA. In
other words, the company will be worth half what it would have been worth in such a case even though the bad
news was that its value had fallen by 10%.
106. The Paulson Report notes that the chances are about 10% that any given company will become the
target of securities litigation in any five year period. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 74. This is a round-
about way of saying that there are about 10,000 listed companies and about 200 SFCAs filed each year. In other
words, two in every hundred companies are likely to get sued in any given year. But the report fails to connect
the dots. If a diversified investor holds 500 different stocks through a mutual fund, ten stocks are likely to be
the target of a securities fraud action each year. If the mutual fund has an annual turnover ratio of 40%-about
the market average-then on the average it will be a buyer in two cases, a seller in two cases, and a holder in six
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A diversified investor is likely to be a non-trading holder of many stocks that
become the target of SFCAs.'1 7 In such cases, non-trading holders effectively reim-
burse buyers because the issuer pays the settlement.' 5 Thus, although diversified
investors break even as traders, they lose as holders. °9 Accordingly, a diversified
investor is not merely indifferent to securities fraud litigation."' A diversified inves-
tor should be positively opposed to the system as it stands."'
cases. The fund and its investors will break even on the 40% of the portfolio that trades during the year, but it
will lose on the 60% that is held. Although the Paulson Report correctly states that holders lose because the
company pays, this bland statement hardly captures the situation. Id. at 79. Holders see their stock fall in price
by more than it should. And perhaps more important, the defendant company sees its market capitalization-
its aggregate value-fall by more than it should. Going forward, the company faces a higher cost of capital than
it should-if it survives. About 30% of defendant companies end up bankrupt or are removed from their
respective exchange. See LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST REFORM-ACT
SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS, 2005 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 14, available at http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/
settlements_2005.pdf. In many cases, defendant companies may be on the verge of failure anyway. See generally
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the
Problems, and How to Fix Them 24 (ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance, No. 44/2004), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (indicating that, without being "propped up by questionable or fraudulent account-
ing, legal, brokerage, investment banking and other financial practices," many companies' shares would have
plummeted). But most publicly traded companies are profitable for shareholders. See Booth, Business Crime,
supra note 81, at 141. For example, Jensen and Murphy estimate that Enron was worth about $30 billion when
it failed but not the $70 billion that the market attached to it. See Jensen & Murphy, supra, at 46. So the
question is why did the market price of Enron fall to zero? Feedback seems a likely answer. The same seems
likely to be the case with WorldCom. See In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp. 2d 392, 406-01, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). In that case, the class period was more than three years long, suggesting that almost all of the
stockholders would be members of the plaintiff class. Id. at 397-98. To be sure, many of the plaintiffs in the
WorldCom litigation acquired their shares from WorldCom itself as the company grew by taking over other
smaller companies in stock for stock deals. Id. Such plaintiffs had legitimate 1933 Act claims against the com-
pany. Id. at 399, 416 n.12. But the irony remains that in the case of both Enron and WorldCom, the plaintiffs
would have been much better off if no SFCA had been filed. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action,
supra note 72, at 1585 (stating that contemporary securities litigation "benefits three sets of actors-corporate
insiders, plaintiffs' attorneys, and insurance companies-but not shareholders"); but see id. at 1555 (noting that
while shareholders in general do not benefit from securities litigation, the Enron and WorldCom settlements
were the largest in U.S. history, making shareholders of those companies relatively better off as a result of the
litigation than shareholders of other companies).
107. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
108. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 21.
109. See id. at 34.
110. Id. at 12.
111. Id. As the Paulson Report points out, any given diversified investor may be on both sides of the
recovery. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 79. If an investor holds shares in the defendant company and
buys more during the fraud period, he may lose as much on the shares he holds as he recovers on the shares he
bought. Id. For this insight, the Report cites Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72. As I
argue elsewhere, holder-buyers who stand to lose more than they gain from a class action would oppose
certification of the action if they could vote on the matter. See Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note
81, at 19 n.50. Thus, there is an inherent conflict of interest within the plaintiff class that should preclude class
certification. Id. at 22. It is no answer that holder-buyers may opt out of the action. Id. at 16. If the action
proceeds as a class action, they must remain in the plaintiff class to obtain their share of any recovery. Id. In
other words, there is a kind of market failure at work here. See generally Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly
Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611 (1995) (comparing the
market failure of zero-sum stock market investing with the market failure resulting from holder-buyers joining
a plaintiff class with interests that are contrary to the investment goals of the holder-buyer). It is thus up to the
courts to remedy the situation by declining to certify the action as a class action. See Booth, Taking Certification
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Indeed, the Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (the
Paulson Report) finds that the public value of securities class action litigation is
questionable because (1) the costs fall on the corporation and thus its stockholders
(even though the company gained nothing from the fraud), (2) settlements account
for a very small percentage of total investor losses, and (3) the settlement is effec-
tively paid by investors who held shares at the time of the fraud to investors who
bought during the fraud period.'12 This litany of problems is really three ways of
saying the same thing: SFCAs suffer from circularity." 3
V. GOOD SECURITIES LITIGATION
Despite the problems inherent in class actions, there may be a point to other forms
of securities litigation. It is possible that insiders-the CEO and other high ranking
officers-may gain from securities fraud. For example, Ken Lay, Jeff Skillings, Andy
Fastow and other Enron insiders sold more than $800 million in Enron stock as the
end drew near. In effect, they misappropriated $800 million from the market."4
This is not to suggest that insider trading as narrowly defined under federal law is
the only way that insiders may do genuine financial harm to outsiders."' For exam-
ple, it is not clear that backdating options constitutes insider trading, but it is quite
clear that it reduces returns to other stockholders." 6 Moreover, even in the absence
of insider gain, failure to be candid with the market may do harm to the reputation
Seriously, supra note 81, at 22. Not all stockholders are necessarily diversified. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98,
at 80. Indeed, recent studies indicate that the average individual investor in the U.S. holds just four stocks even
though one can eliminate virtually all company-specific risk by holding about twenty stocks. Booth, Securities
Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 11. The Paulson Report expresses some concern about undiversified
investors. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 80. But it is well settled that federal securities law protects
reasonable investors. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445 (1976) (observing that the
issue of materiality under the federal securities laws is measured objectively and concerns the significance that a
reasonable investor would attribute to an omitted or misrepresented fact). A passive investor who fails to
diversify assumes more risk than necessary without the prospect of any additional return. Booth, Securities
Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 7. That is irrational behavior for an investor. Id. Moreover, most investors
are well diversified, because at least three-quarters of all stock is held through various institutional vehicles.
Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 189-90. Even if one is reluctant to deny a remedy to undiversified
investors, presumably the interests of the great majority of investors should trump those of a small minority of
investors where the two conflict. Id. at 190. This is not to say that an individual undiversified investor might
not have a legitimate claim on occasion. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, 15-16 n.40. For
example, an investor who seeks to gain control of a target company is likely to be undiversified. Id. Such
investors may sometimes be victims of fraud. See id. But such investors are likely to have claims against an
identifiable seller (whether a stockholder or the company itself) and must likely show reasonable reliance on
some falsehood propounded by a counterparty. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005).
112. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 78-79.
113. Id.
114. See Robert Prentice, Review Essay: Enron: A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 417, 435 n.91
(2003).
115. See, e.g., William Hughes, Stock Option "Springloading": An Examination of Loaded Justifications and
New SEC Disclosure Rules, 33 J. CORP. L. 777, 793 (2008) (explaining how the practice of springloading harms
shareholders).
116. Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 197.
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of the company among investors and cause a drop in stock price.' 7 But who should
recover for such wrongs? In a case of insider trading, it seems clear that the insider
should give back the gain." 8 But to whom? How do we figure out who was on the
other side of a trade? And why should the counterparty recover just because she
happened to buy stock from one of the culprits rather than someone else?
There is a simple solution: issuer recovery."9 The corporation should recover the
ill-gotten gains of insiders.'25 And if the corporation fails to seek recovery, a stock-
holder may file a derivative action on behalf of the corporation. 2 ' If the corpora-
tion recovers, the value of the corporation increases dollar for dollar, and the
recovery is effectively spread over all the stockholders.'22 There is no problem of
circularity.'23 And there is no feedback effect because the company recovers.'24 In-
vestors are compensated to the extent of their true loss-the amount that insiders
have extracted from the market-and not the amount of losses that would have
117. See id. at 201.
118. See Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 131.
119. See id. at 143.
120. This seems quite obvious in a case of reputational harm. It would hardly make sense to make the
corporation pay because it was harmed by one of its agents. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action,
supra note 72, at 1585; Langevoort, supra note 79, at 632-33. Yet that is essentially the system we have with
stock-drop actions. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1585. It also seems clear that
in a case of options backdating, the optionee should give back the ill-gotten options. That remedy addresses the
harm to other stockholders-dilution-quite directly. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 31.
Insider trading has always been a bit confusing on this score because it is not really clear why insider trading is
illegal. See id. at 30. But the misappropriation theory seems now to be well settled. See generally United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) ("[A] person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities transaction,
and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule t0b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities
trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information."). Thus, it seems clear that the
issuer can recover for the insider trading of its fiduciaries. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d
Cir. 1983) (holding that if insider trading is based on a theory of misappropriation of information from the
source of the information, the source of the information may have standing to sue but the counterparty to the
trade does not). It is telling that the 1934 Act takes a similar position in section 16(b) which provides that the
issuer may recover insider gain from short swing trading and that where the issuer fails to do so a stockholder
may maintain a derivative action to that end. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006). This would seem to be a powerful
argument for issuer recovery and against SFCAs under the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. Booth, Securities Fraud
Class Action, supra note 69, at 28.
121. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 9.
122. See id. at 31.
123. See id. at 26 (describing the problems associated with fraud that "involves the repurchase of stock by
the issuing company").
124. Id. at 24.
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occurred anyway. 12 Moreover, the remedy is consistent with the fiduciary duty that
insiders owe to the corporation.'26
Issuer recovery would be easy to implement.'27 The courts could simply deem
SFCAs to be derivative actions-actions in the name of the corporation by which
the corporation recovers.' The character of an action is a matter for the discretion
125. Id. at 19. It is arguable that stockholders suffer no loss from insider trading. Lee, supra note 77, at 165.
There is little reason to think that insider trading causes a stock price to fall any more than it otherwise would.
See Jonathan R. Macey, Securities Trading: A Contractual Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 269, 275-76
(1999) (discussing that insider trading creates a more efficiently functioning market and will typically lead to
more accurate stock prices). Still, the gain from insider trading could offset compensation expense. See Iman
Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 868-70 (2004) (discussing how a board of directors in
possession of material and undisclosed good news regarding the company might provide its managers with
stock options as a means of efficient compensation). Presumably, this tradeoff would be the subject of bargain-
ing between the corporation and insiders if it were legal to do so (which is not necessarily to say that it is not).
See id. On the other hand, other forms of misappropriation (such as backdating of options) dilute outside
stockholder returns. See M.P. Narayanan et at., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options,
105 MICH. L. REv. 1597, 1600, 1605-24 (2007) (analyzing how the backdating of executive options causes
losses to shareholders).
126. Anabtawi, supra note 125, at 861 (describing how the court in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. "decided that a
corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of her corporation unless she has first disclosed all
material inside information" due to the fiduciary duty that an insider owes to the corporation). The Paulson
Report notes that individual defendants rarely pay any part of the settlement in a SFCA except in cases in which
the company is insolvent and has tapped out its insurance. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 78-79. But the
Report stops short of suggesting that individuals should pay more (though it does endorse individual liability
where appropriate). See generally id. This is not too surprising in that the Report finds that securities fraud
litigation confers no benefits on investors. See generally id. (discussing data that illustrates how security class
actions do not do a good job of compensating injured investors, if at all). Rather, the Report suggests a series of
clarifications in the law defining securities fraud and proposes that corporations and their stockholders should
be free to choose alternative dispute resolution methods. See id. at 80-81, 109-10. Specifically, the Report
recommends that the SEC and the courts should clarify the meaning of materiality, scienter, and reliance. Id. at
12. In addition, the SEC should use its powers to prevent duplicative recovery in cases where there is both
private litigation and a SEC enforcement action. See id. at 12-13. And plaintiff lawyers should be prohibited
from engaging in practices that amount to paying clients to serve as plaintiffs. See id. at 82-83. The Report also
addresses the overuse of criminal sanctions and the dangers of imposing excessive liability on auditors and
outside directors. See id. at 84-91. The executive summary emphasizes the need for continued enforcement
against individual wrongdoers. Id. at 11. But curiously, there is almost nothing to that end in the discussion of
SFCAs. See generally id. Rather, the Report ultimately-and rather cryptically-recommends that corporations
and their stockholders should be free to choose alternative dispute resolution methods. Id. at 109-12. This
might be read as something of an endorsement for derivative actions. Neither of these recommendations ad-
dresses the real problem. In essence, the recommendation is that we should be more efficient about handling
pointless litigation. See generally id.
127. See generally Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 24.
128. As a practical matter, a court could so rule in a motion to certify on the rationale that conflicts within
the plaintiff class render an action for individual damages inappropriate for class action treatment under Rule
23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See generally FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Specifically, the interests
of buyers (who want the action to go forward) and buyer-holders (who do not) conflict in a way that cannot be
resolved by the formation of subclasses. See Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 15-19. But
both groups would favor a derivative action if there is insider misappropriation. See generally Booth, Securities
Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 27. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) permits the court to certify an
action as a class action if. "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole .... FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). That is essentially a description of a derivative action (or at
least the part that involves compelling the corporation to sue the wrongdoers). See Booth, Taking Certification
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of the courts." 9 The fact that the parties style the action as a direct (class) action
rather than as a derivative action does not make it so. 3' The real harm from securi-
ties fraud (if any) comes from the misappropriation of stockholder wealth by insid-
ers."' Redistribution of inevitable losses among innocent investors is regrettable,
but stockholders can easily protect themselves from that sort of harm through di-
versification.' To be sure, in the absence of insider gain, the action will likely be
dismissed.' But that is as it should be. No harm, no foul.'34
Diversified investors should be positively opposed to SFCAs except in cases in
which insiders have taken advantage of the situation to divert stockholder wealth
through insider trading or other forms of misappropriation such as timing and
backdating of options.'35 In the absence of insider misappropriation, securities
fraud is a zero-sum game.'36 Buyer losses are offset by seller gains. Investors in the
aggregate neither gain nor lose. " 7 But if insiders use the opportunity to extract
Seriously, supra note 81, at 20. Interestingly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) seems to permit such an
action even in the absence of demand on the corporation. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
129. See, e.g., Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974) (demon-
strating the various points of view that courts can take on whether an action is a shareholder derivative action);
Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004) (noting that it is the court that
will determine the suit's classification by examining the potential relief and the nature of the wrong).
130. Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1035 ("The Court of Chancery correctly noted that '[tihe Court will independently
examine the nature of the wrong alleged and any potential relief to make its own determination of the suit's
classification .... ').
131. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 27.
132. Id. at 18. But see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Vulnerability and Efficiency (of What?), 2 BERKELEY Bus. L.J.
153, 164 (2005) (arguing that shareholders still lose money when a corporation suffers because of managerial
shirking or self-dealing).
133. Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 193. Technically speaking, the issuer suffers no direct harm from
many instances of misappropriation (such as insider trading). William J. Carney, Signalling and Causation in
Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 863, 877 (1987) (discussing why insider trading occurs and the harm
caused to investors). Rather the claim is more one of unjust enrichment on the part of insiders. William W.
Bratton, Self-Regulation, Normative Choice, and the Structure of Corporate Fiduciary Law, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1084, 1092 (1993) (discussing whether insider trading breaches the fiduciary duty even though the corpo-
ration suffers no harm). Still it is well established that a corporation may recover in such circumstances. See
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.04 cmt. c
(1994).
134. In addition, a derivative action is subject to procedural complications (such as the demand require-
ment and the possibility that the corporation may seek voluntary dismissal) that may make it less desirable than
a direct action. Eric Talley, Taking the "I" Out of "Team": Intra-Firm Monitoring and the Content of Fiduciary
Duties, 24 J. CORP. L. 1001, 1008 (1999) (discussing the procedural obstacles at play when bringing a derivative
action). Moreover, the settlement of a derivative action based on misappropriation or other gain to the wrong-
doer likely will not be covered by insurance. A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolu-
tion in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 864 (2003) (discussing the consequences on directors from
lack of insurance coverage). Thus, although defendant companies could argue on their own initiative that
SFCAs should be recast as derivative actions, they are unlikely to do so, because such claims would not be
covered by insurance. See id. As I discuss further below, the SEC could help alleviate these problems by inter-
vening in appropriate situations. See infra Part VI.
135. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 18.
136. Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 190.
137. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 7.
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gains, investors suffer a genuine loss. 3 In such cases, a diversified investor would
prefer to have the issuer recover the ill-gotten gains by means of a derivative action
or a direct action by the issuer.'39 But there is no situation in which a diversified
investor would favor a system of securities regulation that includes SFCAs as we
know them.'4 ° To be sure, an undiversified investor might favor a class action rem-
edy. "' An undiversified investor may suffer real harm from securities fraud. 42 An
investor who forgoes the benefits of diversification and picks a single stock can lose
her entire investment.'43 For such an investor, the benefits of SFCAs may outweigh
the costs.'44 On the other hand, it is not clear that even undiversified investors
should favor the existing system that causes stock price to fall more than it other-
wise would. From an ex ante perspective such an investor is more likely to be a
holder than to be a buyer and is thus more likely to lose as a result of feedback than
to gain from being a member of the plaintiff class. 4
So why should the courts change this well-settled-even if confused and contra-
dictory-system of private securities litigation that has evolved over the past forty
or so years? The answer is that federal securities law is intended to protect reasona-
ble investors.'46 Most investors are well diversified. " 7 And it is arguable that it is
irrational for most investors not to diversify. 4 Accordingly, federal securities law
should be interpreted consistent with the interests of diversified investors."'
138. Id. at 9.
139. Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 143; Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 5.
140. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 5. It is ironic that the Court (per Justice
Ginsburg) begins its recent Tellabs opinion with the statement that it "has long recognized that meritorious
private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions
and civil enforcement actions .... Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007)
(discussing the importance of private actions in order to enforce securities laws). While the Court follows this
statement with the qualification that it also recognizes that the system can be abused to impose unjustified
costs on innocent companies and individuals, the tea leaves seem to indicate that the Justices are not inclined to
scrap the system. See id.
141. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 5.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 4.
145. Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 4 n.ll; see also Booth, Missing Link, supra note
91, at 192.
146. Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 10.
147. Id. at 17 n.57.
148. Id. at 7.
149. One might ask how we ended up with the confused and contradictory system that we now have. The
short answer is that under the 1933 Act investors who buy newly issued stock have an express cause of action
against the issuer if there is any material falsehood in the registration statement or the prospectus. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77k- (2006). But the 1933 Act also provides that the issuer cannot be held liable for any more than the
proceeds of the offering. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). As a result, the courts have ruled that only those investors who buy
stock that is part of the offering may recover. If the issuer is already publicly traded-if the offering is one of
additional stock-it is likely that other "investors [will] read the offering materials and may rely on [false-
hoods] therein in connection with the purchase . . . of [already] outstanding [stock]." Booth, Missing Link,
supra note 91, at 194. The investor would not likely know whether the shares he bought were part of the
offering, but the courts nonetheless required plaintiffs to trace their shares back to the offering in order to have
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VI. WHAT ABOUT DETERRENCE?
Some commentators have argued that although SFCAs do little good for investors,
they are the most important source of deterrence we have. 5 ° Although the threat of
a stock-drop action constitutes wildly excessive deterrence aimed at the wrong tar-
get, eliminating corporate liability would so reduce the incentives to sue that we
would lose the deterrent effect of private litigation.' As John Coffee has stated,
"one cannot safely eliminate corporate liability ... without radically reducing the
likelihood of private enforcement."'5
This is a peculiar argument. If there is so little at stake that the plaintiff bar will
find it uneconomic to sue, so be it.' Moreover, if diversified investors are effec-
tively insured-by virtue of being diversified-against the possibility that they may
buy at the wrong time, what exactly do we want to deter? The only real worry for a
diversified investor is that insiders may take advantage of nonpublic information in
some way to misappropriate stockholder wealth from the market. 4 But there is
little danger of underdeterrence here. There is plenty of motivation for plaintiff
lawyers to file derivative actions."' Who would not be motivated by the prospect of
a fee equal to (say) one-third of the $800 million misappropriated by the officers of
Enron?" 6 Besides, one of the major problems with SFCAs is that the potential dam-
standing to sue. Id. In other words, for investors who bought their shares in the aftermarket, it was largely a
matter of accident whether one had standing to sue under the 1933 Act. Id. It is thus understandable that the
courts would permit other investors to sue under Rule 10b-5 which carries stiffer requirements of pleading and
proof anyway. Indeed, it became routine for plaintiff lawyers to add a claim under Rule 10b-5 to all 1933 Act
claims. Id. It is not surprising that SFCAs became established in the 1960s at a time when most investors were
poorly diversified and heavily focused on company-specific factors. See generally id. Bhattacharya and Galpin
find that in the United States in the 1960s about 60% of trading was motivated by stock picking. Utpal Bhatta-
charya & Neal Galpin, Is Stock Picking Declining Around the World? *3 (Am. Fin. Ass'n Chi. Meetings, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849627. As noted above, they find that today only about 24% of trading
is motivated by stock picking. Id. They predict that the level of stock picking will continue to decline and will
stabilize at about 1 I%. See id. at 6. To be sure, Basic Inc. v. Levinson encouraged a dramatic increase in securi-
ties litigation by endorsing the fraud-on-the-market theory. 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). But there were many
successful class actions before Basic.
150. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1547-48.
151. Id. at 1564 (arguing that a system of managerial liability is not possible until the likelihood of private
enforcement is drastically reduced).
152. Id.
153. Maybe that is why plaintiff lawyers found it necessary to bribe plaintiffs to serve. See Richard A. Booth,
Why Pay a Fraud Plaintiff to Sue?, WASH. POST, June 26, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2006/06125/AR2006062500527.html [hereinafter Booth, Why Pay].
154. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 14.
155. See, e.g., id. at 3 (discussing the total plaintiff attorney fees earned due to SFCAs over the past ten years
leading to 2007, a sum of approximately $7 billion); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 681 (1986) (discussing the incentive for plaintiff attorneys to pursue suits because of the
low search costs involved).
156. In addition, it is possible that misappropriation or other acts of bad faith by insiders may do harm to
the reputation of the business. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 27. If so, it may be
appropriate for the corporation to recover damages over and above the sums that insiders misappropriate. See
Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1558-59. But because a SFCA also causes a
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ages far exceed what is needed for effective deterrence." 7 With issuer recovery, the
amount of any recovery is likely to be quite small compared to amounts claimed in
SFCAs, but it is likely to be significant for an individual defendant. 8
Legal scholars have suggested a variety of other fixes for the class action mess. I"9
Some have suggested a system of civil fines that limit the amount payable by the
corporation. 6 ' The problem with civil fines-as with criminal prosecution-is that
they are not particularly scalable.'6' Fines-and criminal prosecution-are pretty
much one size fits all.'62 And they fit no one particularly well.
The Paulson Report suggests that SEC fines be used to compensate investor vic-
tims and that private awards be reduced by such amounts.'63 But that fix does not
address the feedback problem. The market does not care where the money goes or
the route it takes when the company pays. As long as the issuer remains on the
hook for investor losses, feedback will magnify the loss.164
Others have suggested that issuers be exempt from liability under Rule 10b-5 in
cases in which the issuer itself does not sell stock. 6 To be sure, that fix would leave
decrease in the market price of the subject company, it is impossible to know how much real damage has been
done. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented
Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 153 n.81 (2004) (discussing whether damages are met by the actual
recovery). In the absence of the threat of a class action, this element of damage would become much easier to
measure and where appropriate the corporation could recover. See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 13 (Del.
1998) (discussing the exceptions to the "Delaware carve-outs").
157. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing the potential for
damages awarded in class action suits to be "draconian" and "exorbitant" and explaining that holding insider
traders liable up to the amount gained by their illegal actions serves as sufficient deterrence against insider
trading).
158. See Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 192 n.51.
159. See, e.g., infra notes 160, 165 and accompanying text.
160. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1538. See generally Donald C.
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 639 (1996) (arguing that the
current system encourages many low-merit litigations and excessive settlements and that capping damages
using civil penalty statutes would still deter improper behavior from directors while reducing the number of
suits with little merit); see also Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1487, 1508-12 (1995) (suggesting that civil fines could act as sanctions for regulatory violations instead
of the current system which forces companies to pay compensatory damages to members of class action suits
and that under a new regulatory system, the amount of damages would be easier to calculate).
161. See Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 203 n.107.
162. See generally id. (discussing how a fine of up to three times the gain or loss avoided due to insider
trading does not deter because many defendants probably cannot pay these fines).
163. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 82 (discussing different ways the SEC can prevent overlap of
private lawsuits and Fair Funds Compensation). As the Report notes, the SEC has authority under the Fair
Funds for Investors provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to use funds obtained from civil penalties to compen-
sate victims of securities fraud. Id. For the year 2004, class action settlements totaled nearly $5.5 billion while
SEC monetary sanctions totaled $3.1 billion. Id. at 71.
164. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 8-9 (discussing how the market may cause
the market price of the company stock to fall more than it originally should).
165. Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1582-84. See Joseph A. Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 976-99 (1994) (detailing the SEC's authority to disimply cause of action) [hereinafter Grundfest,
Disimplying Private Rights]. For a response, see Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment
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plaintiffs with nothing but an action against individual wrongdoers.'66 But it does
nothing to change the way damages are calculated against the remaining defend-
ants.'67 Moreover, there may be cases in which the issuer gains from securities fraud
and should disgorge. 6 For example, if the issuer repurchases shares while sitting
on good news, selling stockholders may have a legitimate claim.'69 So to exempt
issuers is overbroad.17 0
It is much simpler to clean up the class action mess with issuer recovery than
with the other fixes that have been proposed. 7' By definition, issuer recovery ex-
empts the issuer because the issuer is the plaintiff.77 Thus, there is no need for an
issuer exemption."' Issuer recovery also limits damages to the amount of insider
gain.'74 It is a much more efficient way to limit damages because the limit is auto-
matically scaled to the offense.'
on Professor Grundfest's "Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commis-
sion's Authority", 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 438-39 (1994) (arguing that there is "insufficient evidence to justify
significant rule or legislative changes that would further burden private federal securities litigation"). For Pro-
fessor Grundfest's response to Professor Seligman, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Why Disimply?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
727, 727-28 (1995) (arguing that the "courts deny that they are the appropriate forum for resolution of the
securities class action policy debate" and that the facts are not as established as Professor Seligman would have
us believe).
166. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1583 (explaining that exempting
non-trading corporations as defendants would ensure only the guilty parties would be penalized).
167. See id. at 1585 & n.81. On the other hand, it should be apparent that it makes no sense to hold other
defendants liable for all the losses suffered by buyers. See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir.
1976) (discussing the importance of showing a causation link between losses suffered by buyers and the de-
fendants in order to hold them liable).
168. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 9.
169. See id. at 26.
170. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
171. See supra Part VIII.
172. See generally Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 24.
173. If the issuer gains from the sale of overpriced stock, investors remain free to sue under the 1933 Act.
See Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 194. If the issuer gains from a repurchase of underpriced stock, sellers
(who no longer own their stock) could maintain a direct (class) action against the issuer as the actual buyer. Id.
at 195. There is no danger of feedback because damages would be limited to the actual gain enjoyed by the
corporation. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 26.
174. See Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 189.
175. Civil fines and criminal prosecution are blunt instruments. The penalty is more or less all or nothing.
See Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 139. In contrast, in a civil action, the plaintiff must plead and
prove damages. Id. Thus, with civil liability you know who lost what and who recovers. In addition, a private
plaintiff must weigh the costs and benefits of filing a civil action. Id. In other words, civil remedies are both
self-executing and self-regulating. Id. As Gordon Gekko might have said, the need to quantify the stakes clears
the mind and focuses the will. Id. at 139 n.76. In contrast, neither a regulator nor a prosecutor must prove
damages. See id. at 139. And neither has much of any reason not to prosecute an offense other than the
prospect of losing. Id. On the other hand, simple compensatory damages may be insufficient deterrence. Id. at
134 n.55. If the only consequence of securities fraud is that one must disgorge ill-gotten gains, there is little
reason not to give it a go. Id. at 131. A similar problem with insider trading is addressed under the Insider
Trading & Securities Fraud Enforcement Act by providing for a treble the gain fine in addition to compensa-
tory damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006).
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Issuer recovery is also consistent with the findings and recommendations in the
Paulson Report.'76 Indeed it is somewhat surprising that the Report fails to connect
the dots and propose a similar solution.'77 For example, the Report suggests that
enforcement should focus more on individual wrongdoers. 7 The Report also ex-
presses general concern about the overuse of criminal sanctions.'79 In addition, the
Report suggests that recent revelations of lawyers bribing plaintiffs indicates that in
many cases plaintiffs are not otherwise inclined to sue because they have not suf-
fered any real loss (or would lose as much as holders as they gain as members of the
plaintiff class).' Finally, the Report also recommends that the SEC clarify the
meaning of scienter.''
Although PSLRA stiffened pleading standards by requiring facts indicating a
strong inference of scienter, we seem to have lost track of the fact that scienter
means intent to defraud-intent to (mis)appropriate the wealth of another by de-
ception.112 However reprehensible it is for a company to lie to the market in the
hope that bad news might be covered up, it is not fraud, and there is no scienter,
unless someone gains in the bargain. 3
176. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at xii-xiii.
177. See generally id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at xii.
180. Id. at 82-84; see also Booth, Why Pay, supra note 153.
181. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 80-81.
182. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006). See also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499,
2504 (2007); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 260-61 (1988) (White, J., dissenting) (questioning whether
there could be fraud where the perpetrator does not trade or otherwise gain); In re Time Warner Inc. Sec.
Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1993) (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that corporate officers could not
have expected alleged fraud to result in gain to the corporation and that accordingly there could be no scienter).
See generally Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 193 & n.52 (arguing that courts should dismiss SFCAs in
which the plaintiff class has not suffered harm because insider gains are not alleged or when the plaintiff has
not alleged or pled with particularity that the defendant acted with scienter).
183. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 260-61 (White, J., dissenting) (questioning whether fraud may exist without
a gain by the wrongdoer); In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 273-75 (arguing scienter could not exist where the
corporate officers would not have expected their allegedly fraudulent actions to benefit the corporation). Curi-
ously, Professor Coffee seems to assume that SFCAs always involve insider gain. See Coffee, Reforming the
Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1547-48. Not true. In 2006, only 42 of 110 cases (38%) involved
allegations of insider trading, while 20 of 110 cases involved options backdating. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
2006, supra note 81, at 14, 20. The Paulson Report also notes that few recent actions have named auditors as
defendants-even though about 60% of cases appear to be based at least in part on allegations of improper
accounting-probably because of the Supreme Court decision in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994), foreclosing claims for aiding and abetting. PAULSON REPORT, supra
note 98, at 87; see also Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1550 & n.60; PRICE-
WATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2007 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 11 (2008). Although the point is that the
accounting profession remains exposed to litigation, the (unintended) suggestion is that many actions are
based on illusory losses. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1550. Similarly, the
report also suggests that the SEC should provide more guidance about what constitutes materiality and reli-
ance. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 80. In both cases, the thrust seems to be to assure that the actions that
are litigated are the ones in which there has been genuine economic loss.
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Arguably, the Stoneridge Court should have considered whether the conduct of
the secondary defendants satisfied the scienter requirement." 4 There is little doubt
that the secondary defendants knew that Charter had asked them to overpay for set
top boxes.' 5 But it is not at all clear that they knew or even suspected that Charter
would mislead its own investors."' There are other possible explanations."7
The courts seem to have forgotten that scienter is more than some kind of
knowledge that a statement is false.' Rather scienter means intent to defraud. 9
And intent to defraud connotes that the perpetrator seeks somehow to gain some-
thing of value by means of deception. 9 So what was the gain for the Stoneridge
defendants? Arguably, they got some free advertising time from Charter. 9' Even if
they had no use for the time, they could presumably sell it.' But it was a product
that no one much wanted, which was why Charter was giving it away in the first
184. To be sure, this question was not before the Court. But arguably neither was the question of reliance.
See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (explaining that
the rebuttable presumption of reliance present under the fraud-on-the-market theory or when "there is an
omission of a material fact by one with a duty to disclose" did not apply in Stoneridge). One must wonder
whether the Court is free to choose the issues that it does and does not address in the cases that it chooses to
decide.
185. See id. at 767.
186. See id. at 766-67.
187. One possibility is that the secondary defendants would have used the free advertising and drawn others
to actually buy advertising. Id. at 766. Incidentally, the scheme seems like one that might have been cooked up
by middle managers without the consent of higher ups. See generally id. at 767 (noting that the involved
"companies drafted documents to make it appear the transactions were unrelated and conducted in the ordi-
nary course of business").
188. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (defining "scienter" as "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud").
189. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2506-12 (2007) (setting out the
requirements for scienter); Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 130. I am not a fan of resorting to the
dictionary. Often as not, dictionary definitions seem to be used as some kind of judicial ice-breaker to begin
the analysis in a vacuum.
190. United States v. Chenaur, 552 F.2d 294, 299 n.7 (1997) ("To act with 'intent to defraud' means to act
knowingly, and with the specific intent to deceive; ordinarily for the purpose of either causing some financial
loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to oneself."). To be sure, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 526 defines scienter solely in terms of intent:
The word 'fraudulent' is here used as referring solely to the maker's knowledge of the untrue charac-
ter of his representation. This element of the defendant's conduct frequently is called 'scienter' by the
courts. Intent and expectation of influencing the other's conduct by the misrepresentation are dealt
with in §§ 531-536 as a separate and distinct element necessary to liability under the rule stated in
§ 525.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 cmt. a (2006). On the other hand, the cases cited by the Restatement
invariably involve some sort of gain to the perpetrator. See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Joiner, 696 F.2d 768, 770
(1982) (where an oil company sued its landman for fraud because he obtained funds above and beyond his
salary and expenses). Moreover, the Court has emphasized that federal securities law is different from common
law fraud. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771 (responding to the argument that the reliance element would have
been satisfied if this were a common law fraud action by observing that "Section 10(b) does not incorporate
common-law fraud into federal law"); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 672 (1997) (indicating
the SEC may prohibit acts that are not fraudulent under the common law). And it may be that the Court's
emphasis on deceit is intended to capture the requirement of gain by the perpetrator.
191. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 766.
192. See generally id.
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place.' 93 There was no reason for the Stoneridge defendants not to take the deal.'94
Indeed, it might have been some kind of breach of fiduciary duty not to take it.'
Ironically, the federal courts have struck such a distinction in insider trading
cases arising under Rule 10b-5.'96 For example, in Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court
declined to find insider trading in a case in which a whistle-blower conveyed mate-
rial nonpublic information to an analyst who used the information to recommend
that his clients sell. the subject stock.'97 The court reasoned that because the whistle-
blower did not seek economic gain from the use of the information, it did not
constitute an illegal stock tip. 9 ' Subsequently, in United States v. O'Hagan, the Su-
preme Court, in upholding the misappropriation theory of insider trading, held
that "a fiduciary who [pretends] loyalty to the principal while secretly converting
the principal's information for personal gain, dupes or defrauds the principal."'99
The Stoneridge Court expressly distinguished Dirks because the tipper there sought
no personal gain."° To be sure, the Stoneridge defendants owed no fiduciary duty to
Charter stockholders. 21' But the point is that even in a situation in which the defen-
dant is a fiduciary, personal gain is required under federal securities law.20 2 The rule
could be otherwise.20 3 A breach of confidence without gain could be enough.0 4 But
the Court wisely requires gain.2" The rule should be the same in a stock-drop case.
The obvious argument against issuer recovery is that no corporation will go after
its own and that the corporation will likely do all it can to thwart any derivative
193. See id. at 766.
194. See id.
195. See Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 611 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) (citing Smith-Shrader Co. v.
Smith, 483 N.E.2d 283 (I11. App. Ct. 1985)) ("Corporate officers ... owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their
corporate employer not to ... hinder the ability of a corporation to continue the business for which it was
developed."). For example, if the board of directors foregoes a tax exemption to which the corporation is
entitled, it might well constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27,
62 (Del. 2006) ("Deliberate indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to act is ... conduct that is clearly
disloyal to the corporation.").
196. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that proof of personal benefit is
necessary to establish tipper/tippee liability under the misappropriation theory).
197. 463 U.S. 646, 665-67 (1983).
198. Id.
199. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
200. Id. at 663.
201. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
202. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 663. The Court also stated: "A company's confidential information ... qualifies
as property to which the company has a right of exclusive use. The undisclosed misappropriation of such
information ... constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement." Id. at 654.
203. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 672-74 (BIackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that personal gain is not an element
of duty because an insider's duty is owed directly to the corporation's shareholders).
204. See id.
205. See, e.g., O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 663 (upholding the misappropriation theory of insider trading by
distinguishing the facts of Dirks, in which the insiders did not act for personal gain).
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action. That is undoubtedly true in a world with SFCAs.2°6 It is only natural that a
company accused of fraud will circle the wagons." 7 And no company would dare
initiate an action against its own officers for fear that it would trigger a ruinous
class action.2"8 Indeed, as the law currently works, it may even be rational to cover
up bad news that is likely to give rise to a class action." 9 If the news is bad enough
that a class action would likely bankrupt the company, there may be nothing to lose
from a cover up.2"' Thus, it is arguable that SFCAs constitute a significant obstacle
to effective corporate governance."' That may explain at least in part the recent
growth in the criminal prosecution of such controversies."'
There is no reason to assume that a corporation will respond in the same way in
the absence of the class action threat."3 In the current environment, one can hardly
fault an outside director who concludes that it is contrary to the best interests of
the corporation to pursue an action against a CEO.214 In the absence of the class
action threat, however, outside directors would themselves be subject to potential
legal action for failure to seek restitution when appropriate. As things stand,
outside directors are practically immune to legal action.2"5
Nevertheless, the question remains: What is to keep the company honest if it is
not liable for misleading the market? In the absence of insider gain, there would
seem to be no reason for a company not to lie to the market. There are at least two
good answers.
First, companies act only through individuals who may be liable for any gain
they enjoy or facilitate for others and for any loss they cause by harming the repu-
206. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 33-34 (arguing that many companies may be
deterred from pursuing claims against their own agents because of the in terrorem effect of SFCAs). If a com-
pany were to pursue its own officers, shareholders may be encouraged to bring a SFCA suit. Id. Settling a SFCA
is prohibitively costly because not only are the plaintiffs paid, but also the value of the stock also goes down. Id.
Therefore, to avoid the consequences of SFCAs, companies would logically avoid pursuing their own agents
and attempt to quash any derivative suits. Id.
207. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1567.
208. The increasing costs of class action settlements have deterred corporations from initiating actions
against their officers. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 5 (noting that class action settlement costs have
increased from $150 million in 1995 to $3.5 billion in 2005); see also Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra
note 69, at 33-34.
209. See generally Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 34.
210. See generally PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 5 (noting the cost of class action settlements).
211. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 34.
212. See Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 140-44.
213. See Booth, The End of Securities, supra note 90, at 51 (stating that SFCAs are a significant impediment
to corporate self policing and that SFCAs deter corporations from making claims against their own agents). In
the absence of a class action threat, corporations have less incentive to cover up CEO misconduct. See generally
Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1567 (articulating the effect of class actions on
corporate conduct).
214. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 33-34.
215. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 90 (citing Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 1055 (2006)).
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tation of the company.2"' Under current law, individuals are (practically speaking)
immune because the company's insurance pays.2 ' To be sure, non-trading insiders
may be protected by the business judgment rule because issuer recovery is essen-
tially a matter of state law.2"' But the business judgment rule may not protect a
non-trading insider from liability if there is a violation of SEC rules.219 Moreover,
the SEC always has the authority to file a civil enforcement action in any such case
and may presumably join a private action where appropriate.22
Second, given that equity is the primary form of compensation for most CEOs
and other high level officers, insiders should have every incentive to assure that the
market is fully informed.22" ' Where equity compensation is the norm, no company
can afford to be blacked out of the market.22 Companies need to issue stock and
options and to buy back stock to control for dilution.223 And officers who exercise
options need to sell stock for tax planning and diversification.224 In other words,
insiders themselves have every reason to keep their companies honest.225
Obviously, equity compensation did not prevent the most recent spate of frauds.
Indeed, some have argued that equity compensation was ultimately to blame. 26 But
the incentives would be quite different if issuer recovery were the rule.22' As things
currently stand, the issuer foots the bill and insiders often keep their gains.228 If
216. See Top Flight Aviation v. Wash. County Reg'l Airport Comm'n, 224 F. Supp. 2d 966, 974 (D. Md.
2002) ("[A] corporation can operate only through the individuals who, as officers, directors, or stockholders,
control the activities, policies, and management of the corporation."). See, e.g., Coffee, Reforming the Securities
Class Action, supra note 72, at 1549, 1566, 1574, 1577 (stating that officers are often sued for liability in
securities litigation alongside the corporation). Removing liability from the corporation and placing it on
individual officers deters fraudulent conduct. See id. at 1579.
217. See generally Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1569-70; PAULSON REPORT,
supra note 98, at 78 ("[T~he potential deterrent function of securities class action litigation is debatable because
virtually all costs fall on the corporation and its insurer.").
218. But see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006).
219. It is not clear that the business judgment rule affords protection against a clear violation of a SEC rule.
See generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (articulating scope of business judgment rule).
Just as speeding constitutes negligence per se if one is involved in an accident even if speeding might otherwise
be reasonable, the violation of an express SEC rule may constitute unprotected illegal behavior for state law
purposes. See Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 199.
220. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
221. Equity-based compensation, when properly designed and implemented, can encourage corporate dis-
closure by aligning the interests of insiders with shareholders. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 106, at 57-58.
222. See generally, Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 198-99 (noting that it is crucial for the market to
be fully informed for options to work properly especially since options are used as compensation to create an
incentive for managers to maximize stock price and reward them when stock price rises).
223. See Richard A. Booth, Going Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 649,
663 (2008).
224. See id.
225. Contra Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1572-73.
226. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 106, at 81-82 ("Providing equity-based incentives based on stock
options grants failed to align executives' interests comprehensively with those of their firms in this period of
generally overvalued equity.").
227. See generally Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 24-27.
228. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1566-67.
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insiders are potentially liable to disgorge any gain-fault or no fault-as misappro-
priation under state law, they should be eager to ensure that the market is fully
informed when they cash out.229 To be sure, one might argue that issuer recovery
would cause officers to insist on even more compensation or costly insurance
against such claims.23 But insurance is not generally available if there is personal
gain involved.23" ' The same goes for indemnification.232
Admittedly, issuer recovery puts the board of directors in a peculiar position.233
In effect, the board becomes an arbiter for the competing claims of officers and
stockholders.' In some cases, the board may pursue claims against officers, while
in other cases, the board may conclude that it is not in the best interest of the
corporation to do so."' But that is a good thing. Again, for a diversified investor,
the only real worry is insider misappropriation.236 Everything else comes out in the
wash. But it is not always clear what constitutes misappropriation.237 For example,
although it seems quite clear that backdating options is usually inappropriate, it is
not so clear that granting options at a time when the stock is trading at a low is
problematic.238 Such decisions are judgment calls.239 The board of directors is well
suited to striking the required balance between stockholder expectations and execu-
tive compensation.24 ° Moreover, to view the board of directors as an arbiter is con-
sistent with the Paulson Report proposal that the SEC should explore the possibility
of permitting companies to opt out of class actions and into alternative dispute
229. See Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 201.
230. See Coffee, Reforming the Securities Class Action, supra note 72, at 1583-85.
231. D&O policies typically exclude coverage on the basis of fraudulent, dishonest, or criminal misconduct.
See id. at 1555-56.
232. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2000); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.51 (1979). A corporation
may, however, advance litigation expenses in most circumstances, subject to an agreement on the part of the
recipient to repay if she does not prevail. See In re RNI Wind Down Corp., 369 B.R. 174, 182 (Bankr. D. Del.
2007).
233. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1979) (explaining that corporate directors must determine
whether to pursue a derivative action "brought by shareholders to enforce a claim on behalf of the
corporation").
234. See id. ("A derivative suit is brought by shareholders to enforce a claim on behalf of the corpora-
tion. . . . [D]irectors are authorized to determine that certain claims not be pursued on the corporation's
behalf.") (citation omitted).
235. See id.; see also Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 192 n.51.
236. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 13-14 (articulating the effects of misappro-
priation on diversified investors).
237. See Cyrus Afshar & Paul Rose, Capital Markets Competitiveness: A Survey of Recent Reports, 2 EN-
TREPREN. Bus. L.J. 439, 474 (2007); see also Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 195.
238. See In re Brooks Automation Inc. Sec. Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88045, at *5 (D. Mass. Nov. 6,
2007); see also Phillip G. Lewis, "Deep" Impact: Can a Tort Theory of Deepening Insolvency Survive in the "Op-
tions Backdating" Era?, 95 Ky. L.J. 919, 921 (2006).
239. See Eric J. Wittenberg, Underwater Stock Options: What's a Board of Directors to Do?, 38 AM. U. L. REV.
75, 85 (1988).
240. See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Breaking the Circle: The Problem of Independent Directors Policing Public
Company Financial Disclosure Under the SEC's New Rules Governing Public Company Audit Committees, 23 ANN.
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 673, 699 (2004).
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resolution."' That seems like an odd idea if one thinks of stockholders and the
corporation as adversaries.242 If that is the model, why should one party to a poten-
tial dispute (the corporation) be permitted to dictate terms to the other (the stock-
holders)? But if one thinks of the typical dispute as one between stockholders and
officers about how to share the corporate wealth, it is easy to see how the board of
directors might officiate.24
Finally, issuer recovery should reduce the need for criminal sanctions by freeing
outside directors to do the right thing.4 The criminalization of controversies that
traditionally have been seen as matters of corporate governance and fiduciary duty
is due at least in part to the failure of boards of directors to monitor management
with any real enthusiasm.24 But the danger of triggering a SFCA-with the poten-
tial for costs far in excess of any benefit to the stockholders-impedes vigorous
action by the board of directors.246 If we eliminate this obstacle to effective moni-
toring by the board of directors, it may not be necessary to prosecute cases that do
not involve a truly criminal enterprise.247
241. PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 109-12. As I have argued elsewhere, it may make more sense to
view a corporation as a partnership between stockholders and officers in which the officers effectively work for
a piece of the action. See Richard A. Booth, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner-
Manager, 2005 U. ILL. L. Rev. 269 (2004). This view is consistent with recent scholarship about team produc-
tion and may explain away much of the recent controversy about executive compensation. See generally Mar-
garet M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999)
(explaining that the "principal-agent" model, which portrays a corporation as bundles of assets owned by
shareholders who hire directors and officers to manage on their behalf, is less accurate than the "team produc-
tion" model, which portrays a corporation as the combined investment of a team comprised of shareholders,
directors, and officers). Coincidentally, Jensen and Murphy have argued that the board of directors should be
viewed primarily as a management monitor and that the support role of the board be viewed as strictly
subordinate to its role as management monitor. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 106, at 53-56.
242. See Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Papers of Professors Fischel
and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 333 (1985).
243. See Terry A. O'Neill, Toward a New Theory of the Closely-Held Firm, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 603, 619
(1993).
244. See generally Booth, Business Crime, supra note 81, at 134-40.
245. See generally id. at 140-44 (discussing the growth of criminal prosecution in matters arising from
bankruptcy that were traditionally seen as matters of fiduciary duty and corporate governance); see also Larry
E. Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 59, 60 (2007).
246. See Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking Efficient Markets Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine
After the Private Securities Reform Litigation Act, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 995, 1039 (2003) (discussing "the enormous
litigation costs involved in securities fraud class actions"); see also Yu-Hsin Lin, Modeling Securities Class Actions
Outside the United States: The Role of Nonprofits in the Case of Taiwan, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 143, 152 (2007).
247. See generally PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 84-86. Moreover, confusion about how to measure
the loss from securities fraud also infects criminal prosecutions in that sentencing guidelines require the courts
to estimate the loss from the fraud. See, e.g., United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(concluding through expert testimony that "confounding factors" made it impossible to determine the actual
loss attributable to fraudulent conspiracy). Not surprisingly, prosecutors and the courts have used the same
(questionable) theories used to estimate stockholder losses in SFCAs with the result that sentences have been
wholly out of proportion with the harm suffered by investors. See Edward A. Dyl, Estimating Economic Dam-
ages in Class Action Securities Fraud Litigation, 12 J. FORENsic EcoN. 1, 1 (1999) (discussing the inaccuracy of
loss estimates in security fraud cases due to the high amount of settlement and the need for attorneys' fees).
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VII. MAKING IT HAPPEN
By recasting stock-drop actions as derivative actions, the courts could in one stroke
eliminate the glaring market inefficiency of circular recovery, lower the cost of capi-
tal for issuers, emphasize individual responsibility, induce boards of directors and
gatekeepers to become more vigilant, and reduce the need for criminal prosecu-
tion.24 What a deal. But aside from indications that the Supreme Court might
welcome it, what will cause the courts to make such a radical change?
Legal scholars seem to agree that it is up to the courts to fix the problem.249
Although the courts might be reluctant to effect such a change, the SEC could
presumably nudge them in right direction by using its broad power to grant ex-
emptions under federal securities law. 5 For example, the SEC might exempt issu-
ers from class actions except in cases in which they have dealt in their own stock."'
One might object that it is somehow inappropriate to focus here on the procedu-
ral form of the action."2 In other words, whether one has a cause of action should
not depend on the procedural device one chooses to pursue it.2"' The easy answer is
that Congress did exactly that in PSLRA and the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act (SLUSA) of 1998 by establishing special rules for securities fraud
actions that take the form of class actions.254 Looking back, that seems like an ex-
traordinary thing to do. On the other hand, it indicates that lawmakers somehow
intuited the problem of circularity.2 5 Moreover, it is quite clear that the courts have
considerable discretion in the management of class actions because they affect the
rights of absent parties. 6 That is the point of the certification requirement.257 A
248. See supra text accompanying notes 172-246.
249. See, e.g., Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha, The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule lob-5 Causes-of-Action:
The Implication of Dura Pharmaceuticals v. Broudo 26 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Discussion
Paper No. 08/2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006088 (discussing the importance of the Court's
decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals in preventing lob-5 damages from becoming a "scheme of investor's
insurance").
250. See generally Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights, supra note 165, at 1011 ("[Tihe Commission has
broad authority to restructure large portions of the securities litigation process").
251. See, e.g., Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit Strategies For International
Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 104 (1997) (noting that the SEC has the power to exempt
issuers from federal regulation).
252. See, e.g., T. Dean Malone, Comment, Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certify-
ing Nationwide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit is a
"Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 817, 829-30 (1997) ("Certifying courts must remember that Rule 23
is merely a procedural device and cannot be a mechanism for creating a new cause of action. Rather, courts
should use Rule 23 only to allow adjudication of established rights. If a case contains a novel claim, a certifying
court must be certain that class adjudication can occur without altering the litigants' well-established rights.").
253. Id.
254. See Russell Kamerman, Securities Class Action: Protecting Small Plaintiffs' Big Money, 29 CARDOZO L.
REv. 853, 860-64 (2007).
255. See James D. Cox, The ALl, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside Director's
Spine, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1233, 1249 n.87 (1993).
256. See Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
257. Leading Case, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997), 111 HARV. L. REv. 349, 350
(1997).
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derivative action is ultimately a type of class action."' It would seem to follow (as
the Delaware courts have known for a long time) that the courts have the power to
decide what form an action should take.25 9 Here too, the SEC could play an impor-
tant role by intervening in SFCAs at the certification stage. 260
Some scholars have expressed doubt that the courts will be willing to make the
necessary changes in the law.2 6' I am more optimistic that the courts will do the
right thing, particularly if plaintiff attorneys realize that there is a living to be made
from prosecuting derivative actions. 62 As I argue elsewhere, in addition to an ac-
tion based on unjust enrichment, there are other elements of damages arising from
securities fraud (such as reputational harm to the corporation) that a derivative
plaintiff might pursue.263 Moreover, there is a fundamental conflict between the
plaintiff class and the plaintiff corporation in a derivative action.264 A zealous deriv-
ative plaintiff should argue that the recovery for unjust enrichment and reputa-
tional harm should go to the corporation and not to the class.265 Moreover, the
derivative plaintiff as a representative of the corporation should argue that the class
action should be dismissed in order to prevent dissipation of corporate assets and
derivative harm to the stockholders (including both buyers and non-trading hold-
ers). 66 When the issue is so joined, the courts may have no choice but to fish or cut
bait. It may not be possible to avoid making a decision between the mutually exclu-
sive alternatives of class action and derivative action. 267 Although it has become
increasingly common for derivative actions to be filed along side SFCAs, no court
has yet been forced to choose between the two as arguably it should.268
Some scholars have also suggested that corporations or their stockholders may be
able to fix things by means of charter or bylaw amendments that govern stock-
holder actions. 269 Adam Pritchard has suggested that a corporation could specify
258. Cecilia Lacey O'Connell, Comment, The Role of the Objector and the Current Circuit Court Confusion
Regarding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1: Should Non-Named Shareholders Be Permitted To Appeal Adverse
Judgments?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 939, 940 n.4 (1999).
259. See Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 23.
260. See Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 403, 451 n.220 (2003).
261. See Pritchard, supra note 55, 28-45 (also expressing doubt about whether Congress or the SEC is likely
to act).
262. As Pritchard notes, the fees to be made from class actions are not all that generous on average. So fees
from derivative actions may suffice. Id. at 35-36.
263. See Richard A. Booth, Direct and Derivative Claims in Securities Fraud Class Actions (forthcoming).
264. See Stephen J. Kastenberg & Lesley Frieder Wolf, The Company v. Itself- Derivative Action Pitfalls,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Mar. 2006, at 15, 15.
265. See Jeffrey P. Strickler, Inside Information and Outside Traders: Corporate Recovery of the Outsider's
Unfair Gain, 73 CAL. L. REV. 483, 509 (1985).
266. See Booth, Taking Certification Seriously, supra note 81, at 13 n.32.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. See generally Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern
Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 424 (2005) (suggesting that a company could include a class action waiver
in its corporate charter).
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that the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance does not apply to it.27° A
more straightforward approach would be a provision to the effect that in order to
recover from the corporation in any action based on a purchase or sale of the
company's stock-or other securities for that matter-the plaintiff must prove ac-
tual reliance.27" ' As Pritchard recognizes, it might be argued that this limitation on
liability constitutes an impermissible waiver of compliance under section 29 of the
1934 Act.272 His response is that waiver of the presumption of reliance does not
constitute a waiver of compliance.273 I might argue further that neither does the
waiver of an implied right of action constitute a waiver of compliance with the act
or rules thereunder.274 So perhaps a corporation could even adopt a rule that pro-
vides that it shall not be liable to any stockholder except in a situation in which the
corporation itself has traded in its own securities.275 Specifically, the corporation
may be liable to buyers only if the corporation has sold securities and may be liable
to sellers only if the corporation has bought securities.276
As Pritchard also notes, the Supreme Court has addressed the waiver issue in
only one setting-in connection with mandatory arbitration clauses-and there
only in connection with one-on-one broker-customer disputes and broker-em-
ployee disputes-both of which tend to be small potatoes as compared to SFCAs
that are imbued with public interest.277 Moreover, the waiver in question in such
cases is not one that relates to compliance with substantive provisions of the 1934
270. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 34.
271. See Jonathon P. Altman, Note, Rule lOb-5 and Reasonable Reliance: Why Courts Should Abandon Focus
on Non-Reliance Clauses, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 747, 755 (2007) (proposing that a plaintiff must prove actual
reliance).
272. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 39.
273. Id. at 40.
274. See id. at 34.
275. Id.
276. Id. The Paulson Report suggests that defendant corporations could adopt charter amendments that
would require arbitration of such disputes. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 98, at 110-11. See also Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 451 (2003) (holding that mandatory arbitration clauses may extend to class
actions and that whether it does is a question for the arbitrator to decide). Bazzle will undoubtedly lead to
arbitration clauses that require arbitration but prohibit class arbitration. See Gilles, supra note 269, at 409-11;
Samuel Estreicher & Michael J. Puma, Arbitration and Class Actions After Bazzle, 58 DiSp. RESOL. J. 13, 18
(2003). The question that then arises is whether the arbitration clause effectively prevents a plaintiff from
pursuing a class action. One argument that it should do so is that the arbitration and class actions may be seen
as substitutes for each other. Both are designed to reduce the cost of litigation in their own way. So there is an
argument to be made that arbitration obviates the need for a class action. See generally Peter M. Mundheim,
The Desirability of Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: Challenges Facing the Industry Regulators in the
Wake of Mastrobuono, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 202 (1995) (finding that arbitration reduces costs). But see Jean
R. Stearnlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1, 108 (2000) (arguing that there may be constitutional, statutory, and contractual limits on
arbitration that would prevent arbitration from effectively serving as a substitute to class actions). In the end,
there is no reason not to prosecute class actions as efficiently as possible. See id. at 109 (finding that class-wide
arbitration would have the same efficiencies as class-wide litigation, and that policy would support the arbitra-
tion over litigation); Richard A. Booth, Punitive Damages and Securities Arbitration in the Wake of Mas-
trobuono, 9 INSIGHTS, June 1995, at 20.
277. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 39.
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Act but rather the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts in connection with
cases arising thereunder.278 On the other hand, the fact that the Court has signed
off on the arbitration of disputes arising under the 1934 Act suggests that the Court
might well approve a rule governing procedural aspects of securities litigation.279
For example, the corporation might adopt a rule providing that any SFCA filed
against the corporation be deemed to be an action on behalf of the corporation-a
derivative action-to recover any amount that may have been misappropriated
from the corporation or any damage that may have been done to the corporation
except to the extent that the corporation itself is alleged to have sold stock to or
bought stock from the plaintiff class.28
Arguably this provision is no waiver at all because it is consistent with virtually
all applicable state and federal law.2"' In other words, such a provision could be
seen as a clarification of how the law should be applied in a situation in which the
law itself is quite confused.2 2 First, state law generally favors derivative actions over
class actions.28 3 That is, to the extent that an injury may be characterized as deriva-
tive it should be so characterized because recovery redounds to the benefit of the
stockholders pro rata."' And Congress expressly preserved derivative actions when
it enacted SLUSA in 1998.285 Second, although federal law now provides for an
individual remedy for insider trading, it also recognizes that the misappropriation
theory is based on a duty that runs to the corporation"' To be sure, the corpora-
278. See id. at 40.
279. See generally id.
280. For an argument that a corporation could adopt such a rule, see Gilles, supra note 269, at 424.
281. See id. at 376-77 (explaining that class action waivers have not been found unconscionable by state
courts and that the federal claims currently challenging class action waivers are narrower in scope than the state
claims, and therefore more likely to fail).
282. See Ann M. Scarlett, Confusion and Unpredictability in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: The Delaware
Courts' Response to Recent Corporate Scandals, 60 FLA. L. REv. 589, 590-94 (2008) (discussing the confusion in
law of derivative actions, but suggesting statutory reform to clarify the standards for the business judgment rule
and breach of fiduciary duty).
283. Eric Talley, Securities Fraud Class Actions: 70 Years Young, RAND REV. (Summer 2004), available at
http://www.rand.orglpublications/randreview/issues/summer2004/42.html (noting the increase in derivative
actions in state courts after SLUSA effectively eliminated securities class actions from state courts in 1998).
284. See generally Anglo Am. Sec. Fund v. S.R. Global Int'l Fund, 829 A.2d 143, 149-50 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(explaining that if the plaintiff alleges an injury that affects the shareholder's pro rata interests, then the claim
should be a derivative action, and that, although this seems straightforward, "differentiation of direct from
derivative claims can be elusive"). But when it comes to procedure, and indeed the content of the FRCP, it is
the responsibility of the courts to make the law. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (Congress gave the judicial branch the
power to promulgate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure through the Rules Enabling Act).
285. 15 U.S.C. § 77p(f)(2) (Supp. 2008); 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(5)(c) (2006).
286. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that if insider trading is based
on a theory of misappropriation of information from the source of the information, the source of the informa-
tion may have standing to sue but the counterparty to the trade does not); see also Recent Case, United States v.
Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), 109 HARv. L. REV. 536, 536 (1995) (observing that misappropriation theory
is based on "fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence").
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tion may have no standing to sue under federal law unless it was a buyer or seller." 7
But the corporation can always sue under state law."' Third, federal securities law
is almost all about unjust enrichment." 9 The two express remedies under the 1933
Act essentially require the recipient to refund any investment made without full
disclosure.29 Arguably, it was by a false analogy to the 1933 Act that SFCAs became
established. 9' And under the 1934 Act, the remedy for short-swing trading-a
form of insider trading-is that the culprit must give up his gain (or loss avoided)
to the issuer.292 Indeed, the statute specifically states that the action may be prose-
cuted as a derivative action if the issuer fails to sue.293
On the other side of the ledger there is the well-established institution of SFCAs
as recognized by PSLRA and SLUSA.2 94 But that begs the question. The one and
287. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730-31 (1975) (citing Birnbaum v. New-
port Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (1952)) ("[A] private damage action under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 [ijs limited
to actual purchasers and sellers of securities").
288. See Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 8 (Del. Ch. 1949) (finding that the plaintiff corporation
sufficiently stated a cause of action against its employee because a duty ran from the employee, who used the
acquisition of secret knowledge relating to his employer's business to make a profit for himself, to the corpora-
tion); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 912 (N.Y. 1969) (affirming an order denying a motion to
dismiss a complaint which, although absent an allegation of damage to the corporation itself, alleged officer
and director accountability to the corporation for gains realized by selling corporate stock subsequent to learn-
ing of material inside information); Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 187 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that Indiana
law has never recognized a corporation's right to bring suit against corporate officers and directors for alleged
illegal trading of corporate stock on the basis of material inside information); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F.
Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding that the derivative plaintiff did have a cause of action under New
Jersey common law when seeking relief from individual corporate officers alleged to have benefited from in-
sider trading); Davidge v. White, 377 F. Supp. 1084, 1087-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (allowing the plaintiff, by apply-
ing Delaware law and following Brophy, to bring a cause of action under Delaware common law for breach of
fiduciary duty, even though the plaintiff was not a purchaser or seller of the securities, and therefore had no
standing under federal law). But see Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 744-47 (Fla. 1975) (rejecting a claim by
corporation under Florida law, holding that state precedent required "actual damage" to the corporation be
alleged, and refusing to extend the fiduciary duty of common law set forth in Diamond to the defendants who
benefitted from insider trading, but who were not directors or officers of the corporation); Goodwin v. Agassiz,
186 N.E. 659, 660-61 (Mass. 1933) (rejecting the plaintiff's common law fraud claim against the directors of a
corporation who purchased the plaintiff's stock because the information that the defendants knew was only a
speculative theory, there was not a duty to disclose, and the corporation was not harmed from the nondisclo-
sure of the information).
289. See SEC v. JT Wallenbrock & Assocs., 440 F.3d 1109, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming that securities law
is designed to deprive a wrongdoer of unjust enrichment); see also NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMIS-
SION, FINAL REPORT, ISSUES IDENTIFIED BY THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT AND OFFICE OF GENERAL COUN-
SEL OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION app'x F-4, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/
nbrc/report/f4.pdf.
290. See Alexander, supra note 160, at 1490 n.7 (1995) (explaining the two types of remedies under the
1933 Act); Richard A. Booth, Capital Requirements in United States Corporation Law 8 (Univ. of Md. Legal
Studies, Research Paper No. 2005-65, 2005).
291. Booth, Missing Link, supra note 91, at 44.
292. Id. at 46.
293. Id.
294. See generally U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION:
THE PROBLEM, ITS IMPACT AND THE PATH TO REFORM 36-37 (July 2008), available at http://
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/docload.cfm?docld=1213 (discussing the purposes of the PSLRA and
the SLUSA).
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only provision that provides for an individual right of action (other than under the
1933 Act) is section 18 of the 1934 Act.29 That section, which is seldom used,
provides for an individual remedy in cases in which an investor can prove reliance
on a false statement in a document filed with the SEC. 96
To be sure, waiver of the fraud-on-the-market presumption would preserve the
possibility that one or more plaintiffs who could not prove reliance might nonethe-
less recover from the corporation.2 9' For example, a large investor such as a mutual
fund might be able to prove that its analysts relied on specific false statements
disseminated by the corporation. One might argue that it is crucial to preserve this
possibility in order to avoid waiver.298 Moreover, one might argue that a derivative
action is an inadequate alternative because the cause of action would belong to the
corporation and because the corporation would not have standing to sue under
federal law because of the Blue Chip Stamps doctrine which limits standing to those
who purchase or sell securities.299 Neither of these considerations outweighs the
advantages of derivative actions.
First, to say that a large investor such as a mutual fund might be fooled into
making a significant investment has a hollow ring."° It seems much more likely
that a well-advised fund would either depend on diversification to protect itself
from misinformation in run-of-the-mill trading decisions or do enough research to
uncover the truth (or at least doubts about issuer representations) when contem-
plating a major position.3"' Moreover, it seems likely that many significant invest-
ments will involve purchase of securities directly from the corporation or a major
stockholder, in which case the buyer will likely have an action against the seller if
any relief is appropriate. 2
295. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2006); see also MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS: OVERVIEW OF
MAJOR FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 3 (2007).
296. Id. Ironically, it is a common practice at the SEC to exempt many documents from this provision by
deeming them not to be filed documents. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 915 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that
the corporation's annual report which allegedly contained false or misleading financial information was not
considered a filed document for section 18 liability); see also In re Digi Int'l, Inc., Sec. Litig., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1089,
1103 (D. Minn. 1998) (holding that alleged reliance on quarterly financial statement fails to state a claim under
section 18).
297. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 34.
298. See id. at 38-39.
299. See id. at 35 n.1 1; Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 725 (1975) (holding that only
purchasers and sellers of securities may bring suit for damages).
300. See, e.g., Michael E. Murphy, Dispelling Tina's Ghost from the Post-Enron Corporate Governance Debate,
43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63, 77 n.66 (2002) (explaining the stringent diversification requirements placed on
mutual funds by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Internal Revenue Code and that the require-
ments, such as not being able to invest more than 5% of the company's investment assets into the securities of
one company, would reduce the likelihood that a mutual fund be fooled into making a large investment).
301. See Booth, Securities Fraud Class Action, supra note 69, at 11.
302. Thus, SFCAs are reminiscent of actions against accountants by third parties. See Frederick D. Green et
al., Holding Accountants Liable: The Liability of Accounts to Third Parties, 15 EMp. RESP. & RTs. J. 23 (2003)
(discussing the legal theories of accountant liability stemming from the Ultramares Doctrine). For some reason,
the courts seem to have ignored the well-settled rule that a reader of financial statements may sue only if the
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Second, the possibility that Blue Chip Stamps would preclude a corporation from
suing insiders in federal court is of little moment. Again, the corporation can al-
ways sue in state court. Moreover, it is not clear that the rule of Blue Chip Stamps
applies in this setting. The rule is designed to limit the exposure of issuers to ac-
tions by holders.3"' To say that this judge-made limitation on a judge-made cause of
action precludes an issuer from enforcing federal securities law against its own
insiders would be quite extraordinary, particularly in light of section 16(b) of the
1934 Act, which expressly provides for such an action in connection with short-
swing trading.1 4 So it is not at all clear that the courts would apply the rule to a
corporate plaintiff seeking to sue in federal court.05
financial statements were prepared for the reader. Id. at 25, 26. Then again, federal securities law effectively
renders all corporate disclosures for the benefit of investors, though one could argue that that is only really true
where the issuer seeks to induce an investor to buy stock or other securities directly from the issuer or the
issuer's agent. See Paul P. Brountas Jr., Rule 10-5 and Voluntary Corporate Disclosures to Securities Analysts, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1517, 1532 (1992).
303. See Note, Standing Under Rule 10-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REV. 413, 414-15 (1976).
304. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2006). See generally Strickler, supra note 265, at 487 n.28.
305. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 87 (2006) (holding that under
SLUSA, state law class action claims brought by holders of securities, purchasers of securities, and sellers of
securities are preempted); see also Richard A. Booth, Who Should Recover What for Late Trading and Market
Timing?, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 101 (2006) (discussing the applicability of the Blue Chip Stamps doctrine in
connection with the recovery by mutual funds). Neither is it clear that the Blue Chip Stamps rule would
preclude the corporation from recovering for the full amount of insider misappropriation if it bought or sold a
token number of shares. See Recent Case, United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), 109 HARV. L. REV.
536, 536 (1995). Moreover, a derivative plaintiff who happened also to be a buyer may have standing to sue in
federal court even though action is for the benefit of the corporation. Neal R. Pandozzi & David R. Werbel,
Practice Guide: Getting Down to Business: A Pocket Guide to the Revised Rhode Island Business Corporation Act,
10 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 719, 725 (2005). To be sure, these are strange arguments. But they are designed
to deal with a rule-the Blue Chip Stamps rule-that grew out of a misguided turn of the law. Scott Jones,
Note, Revisiting Birnbaum: Changed Conditions and the Providence of the Purchaser-Seller Rule, 2006 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 603, 625-26 (2007). On the other hand, it might also be argued that the issuer cannot have been
deceived if the issuer did not itself buy stock during the fraud period. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S.
642 (1997) (holding that, under a theory of misappropriation, criminal liability can be attached based on
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to a defendant who purchased stock in the corporation based on
inside information). The statement in Stoneridge that conduct can be deceptive may be designed to head off
this argument at the pass. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008)
("Conduct itself can be deceptive, as respondents concede."). Still, in emphasizing that there can be no liability
under federal law without deception and that O'Hagan could have escaped prosecution simply by disclosing
that he intended to trade on inside information, the Court sought to distinguish federal law from the state law
of fiduciary duty, perhaps because the Court was concerned that otherwise federal law would simply afford an
alternative remedy that might supplant state law or that it might be argued that federal law was unnecessary in
this context. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654-55. The distinction is that under state law, disclosure would not cure
such a breach of the duty of loyalty. See id. Either way the statement in O'Hagan that there must be actual
deception based on a fiduciary duty (and presumably a breach thereof) is ultimately dictum. See id. at 654. The
Court has never been faced with a case in which an insider announced his intent to trade on inside informa-
tion. To be sure, Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) comes close. But the transaction there-a
short form merger-was one that was expressly authorized by state law and one that would have been actiona-
ble if there had been any remedy available under state law at the time. Id. at 478.
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CONCLUSION
Stoneridge is hardly a landmark decision in the evolution of federal securities law or
even private securities litigation thereunder. But it does suggest an opportunity for
reform. The best hope is that plaintiff attorneys will see the promise of derivative
actions as an effective alternative to class actions and will come to oppose class
certification as contrary to the interests of the corporation and the non-trading
stockholders that usually constitute a majority of the affected investors. Another
approach is to focus on the true meaning of scienter and deceit. Neither can exist in
the absence of gain. So unless the corporation somehow gains from fraud, the
fraud is damnum absque iniuria-damage without a wrongful act. A fortiori, there
is no causation. But when insiders use the opportunity for gain, they should be
answerable individually. Finally, this rearrangement of the remedial scheme has the
added and significant benefit of focusing deterrence where it matters and in pro-
portion to the true harm involved.
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